

# THE UNBROKEN RECORD

Soviet Treaty Compliance

by Daniel Rosenberg



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## FOREWORD

It would be tedious and repetitive to list the statements and the poll percentages that consistently show a huge majority of U.S. citizens join the rest of the world in regarding the arms race as wasteful and suicidally dangerous, as well as irresponsible and absurd.

Recent research has made clear that even a limited nuclear missile exchange could create the "nuclear winter"; that extinction, not "victory," could well be the result. Our struggling world waits and works with ever greater insistence for the beginning of a real beginning to disarmament, to end forever the nuclear cloud.

The U.S. peace majority has not yet been able to translate its sentiment into Congressional majorities, much less curb the arms mania stemming from the military-industrial complex and the White House. One obstacle to faster progress is a widespread impression that negotiations are futile because the Soviet Union is an unreliable treaty partner. The popular media is constantly employed to project this same impression, although many members of the diplomatic and scholarly establishment

know that the Soviet government takes its treaty obligations most seriously.

Dr. Rosenberg examines the assertions of Soviet misuse of the treaty process. He makes a compact survey of the high points in the diplomatic history of the Soviet state. Emphasis is particularly placed upon the forty-year period from the wartime conferences to the present. All of the most controversial episodes are included: the 1939 non-aggression pact, Yalta, Potsdam, the Baruch Plan, the SALT agreements and the Helsinki Final Act. Primary sources are cited, and the facts examined. For all but the specialist, much of the material may be new and surprising. In any case, it is useful to have it in one reference handbook.

This study draws an image of Soviet diplomacy as careful, consistent, tough-minded, but responsible. It supports the assertion Ambassador Joseph E. Davies made in 1941: "The Soviet government has a record of keeping its treaty obligations equal to that of any nation on earth."

Assertions of Soviet unreliability cannot honorably be used as an excuse to discount the specific disarmament initiatives of the Soviet leadership. The Soviet moratorium on all nuclear testing for the rest of 1985 (announced on August 6th) has been largely ignored in official quarters, although a realization of its significance has begun to penetrate into new sections of the U.S. peace movement and the public mind.

At this writing, the whole world awaits U.S. response to the new Soviet proposals outlined by Mikhail Gorbachev and being placed on the table at Geneva. The world's peoples have every right to insist that the U.S. leaders respond in a serious, responsible and constructive way to reopen the path to mutual steps to disarmament;

now, before a new level of escalation takes place that will make controls incomparably more difficult.

The moral of this book is a message to the peace movement in the United States and to those millions just becoming involved: There is no task more urgent or opportunity more glorious than to create here at home the political pressure necessary for genuine progress toward agreement on mutual reduction of arms. Let us work unceasingly for Star Peace, not Star Wars.

Alan Thomson, Executive Director  
National Council of American-  
Soviet Friendship  
October, 1985



# THE UNBROKEN RECORD

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## INTRODUCTION

When Soviet actions threaten the peace or violate a solemn agreement or trample on standards fundamental to the civilized world, we cannot and will not be silent.  
—Ronald Reagan, June 27, 1984.

In October, 1984, the Reagan administration revived a very old charge: that the Soviet Union was not living up to international agreements and treaties, nor to universally accepted norms of international law. The USSR was accused of violating, among other agreements, the Geneva Protocol (1925) against chemical weapons, the Test-Ban treaty (1963), SALT I (1972), the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972), and SALT II (1979). These allegations were in a report prepared for the President by the (non-governmental) General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament.

News of the report drew a storm of criticism from some of the nation's top arms experts and scientists, who asserted that the USSR was adhering to the treaties it had signed. Moreover, critics pointed to the specious line of thinking encouraged by the new report: the United



States could exempt itself from abiding by the "violated" pacts because of alleged duplicitous Soviet behavior. If "they" broke them, so could "we"; therefore, if the Soviets were assumed to be cheating, the United States was no longer under obligation to follow the arms control stipulations of those treaties.

The allegations in the General Advisory Committee report had first been made by President Reagan in January, 1984, and he had promised a full account later in the year. Originally scheduled for release in mid-September, the report had been withheld for some weeks for fear of ruining the approaching talks with Andrei Gromyko, then the Soviet foreign minister. Gromyko was barely on the plane back to Moscow when the report became public, though with this significant admission in President Reagan's cover letter: "Neither the methodology of analysis nor the conclusions reached in this report have been formally reviewed or approved by agencies of the U.S. government."

Ronald Reagan is not often embarrassed or ashamed to make even the wildest anti-Soviet allegations. It was he who named the USSR an "evil empire." He has supported U.S. first-strike capability, opposed a nuclear freeze, advocated the extension of the arms race into outer space, ordered U.S. intervention in Grenada and Nicaragua, justified a CIA manual describing ways to "neutralize" opponents, and defended apartheid in South Africa—all on the claim of the "Soviet threat."

The first Reagan administration prompted the emergence of the most powerful peace movement in the history of our country.

Hundreds of cities passed nuclear freeze and nuclear-free zone resolutions despite the administration's contention that the Soviets were "ahead" in arms. Mil-

lions turned out for peace rallies, concerts, festivals and demonstrations. Jesse Jackson's presidential campaign generated widespread response to a platform that included disarmament, negotiations and peace.

In a sense, the General Advisory Committee's report was released shamefacedly, but it has nonetheless been cited ever since as factual. The administration may indeed seek to buttress and confirm its findings; there are rumors of more reports and still further charges. The value of negotiations with the USSR is left in doubt. And that is the point, the goal. So what if the findings cannot all be proved! If they are repeated often enough, perhaps they will be believed. The administration wants people to have an image of a peace-loving Reagan whose desire to negotiate falls victim to unfortunate Soviet "violations."

In games or sports, one sometimes encounters charges of cheating. Indeed, games may have been fixed, rules waived, an unfair advantage exploited. But the charge also surfaces when an opponent proves to be far stronger and more able than had been assumed, and often at such times, it appears that the accuser raises the charge when in danger of losing the contest.

But international relations are not games. Peace and peaceful coexistence involve the very survival of the planet. Cheating in this realm is more serious. The stakes are the highest.

The charge of Soviet violations is not a new one. It did not begin with Ronald Reagan. Since the end of World War II, the Soviet Union has been accused of violating the Yalta and Potsdam agreements; the United Nations Charter; trade agreements and contracts; the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation

in Europe (Helsinki, 1975), particularly its human rights provisions; and a host of arms control treaties.

When Winston Churchill said in October, 1939, that "Russia . . . is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma," he wasn't introducing a new idea. A survey of officially sanctioned U.S. perceptions of the Soviet Union over the years indicates that beneath our government's attitude to Soviet foreign policy—underlying the perennial charge of Soviet "violations"—is the assumption that the Soviet government, the Soviet Communists, and the Soviet people are strange, immoral, not human. No "mutual confidence or trust," and "no respect" could exist between the USA and the Soviet state, wrote Secretary of State Bainbridge in 1920, because the Soviet government "is determined and bound to conspire against our institutions," and has "no intention" of adhering to agreements.<sup>1</sup>

The pattern of accusations actually began in 1917. They have been made by both Republican and Democratic administrations and are part of the myth of the Soviet "threat." Despite nearly seventy years of evidence to the contrary, that myth continues to motivate leaders of power and influence. One still hears that "the Russians are coming," that they intend to take over the world now, or soon, or later; that bent on global subversion, they will use Cuban, Angolan, Ethiopian, Vietnamese, Nicaraguan or other "proxies" toward that end; that they have, or have had, or seek military superiority.

The only official exceptions to this outlook developed during the New Deal years. The first F.D.R. administration recognized the Soviet Union and established

diplomatic relations. The fruitful wartime cooperation of the US, Britain and the USSR not only defeated the Axis but reached agreements that resulted in the founding of the United Nations. This history is instructive for our own time, and has been the subject of distortion by the Soviet-haters.

Even during those years, Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt said of Soviet diplomats in 1941:

They do not and cannot be induced to respond to the customary amenities . . . it is not possible to create "international good will" with them . . . they are not affected by ethical or moral considerations nor guided by the relationships which are customary between individuals of good breeding.<sup>2</sup>

The cold war witnessed frequent reiteration of the theme that the Soviets could not be trusted. President Harry Truman told a gathering in September 1951: "A Bolshevik agreement is not worth the paper it is written on." Soviet "peace offensives"—proposals and the like—were, therefore, considered only a design to hoodwink and confuse. Senator James Eastland (D-Mississippi) wrote in 1955:

You must be a liar, a cheat, and probably a spy, before you can represent a Communist nation in international diplomacy. You must have no more regard for honor when you sign an agreement on behalf of your country than a forger does when he puts a name on a check.

For the Soviets, editorialized the *Wall Street Journal* in 1961, "'negotiation' is a means of waging the struggle, not trying to end it." The *New York Times* found the Soviet "way" of negotiating "interminable, baffling, exasperating," filled with "doubletalk."<sup>3</sup>



This has not been mere opinion, but rather the *policy* often guiding U.S. representatives in state-to-state relations. "What is an agreement?" asked Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in 1957: "An agreement is a meeting of minds. And so far I do not know of any agreement that the Soviet Union has made which has reflected a real meeting of minds." Henry Kissinger told a 1980 meeting that the "Soviets tend to treat our negotiators the way psychiatrists treat their patients: No matter what you say to them, they think they understand us better than they understand themselves."<sup>4</sup>

Clearly, these assessments did not end with the period of detente. At the initial SALT talks in 1969, the Soviets hinted they might change their "style," according to columnist Joseph Alsop: the "propaganda-spouting, the interminable squabble over an agenda, the endless maneuvering for this or that petty advantage," the tendency "to feel out the adversary in the most exhaustive and exhausting manner possible, in order to discover points of weakness"—what Alsop considered the whole peculiar, bizarre Soviet approach, seemed at an end. Even so, observer Marquis Childs found Soviet SALT specialists all of a type, with "closed faces," impassive, emotionless mirrors of a "closed and secret society." Columbia University professor Philip Mosely at the same time revealed that the typical Soviet diplomat could not grasp the meaning of "compromise"; the word does not exist in the Russian language, the scholar told the *Washington Post*, and thus, to him, the Soviet representative acted "like a traveler by night in the forest who must be constantly on the watch for the smallest sound or sight of treachery."<sup>5</sup>

Richard Nixon, a veteran of negotiations with the Soviet Union, claims to have learned the lesson that talks

should continue, but we must be tough, "should not mince words," must force the Soviets to "change their aggressive behavior." Anyone who "believes he can get the men of the Kremlin to change their policies by charming them or simply through personal persuasiveness is due for a rude awakening." The Soviet leaders, wrote the former president in 1984, yearn to be accepted into the world community, they want to be part of the "club." Staunch guardian of moral conduct that he is, Nixon feels "we should agree to admit the Soviet leaders into the 'club,' . . . only if they agree to abide by the rules."<sup>6</sup>

The socialist Soviet Union has developed an economy that now leads the world in production of oil, steel, iron, cement, locomotives, wool, shoes, tractors, harvesters, and milk—among other items. Even the CIA questions the gloomy accounts of the Soviet social and economic system to which we have become accustomed. That the USSR poses an alternative, another way of producing and distributing the necessities of life, a way that has struck a responsive chord among significant numbers of people in Western and developing countries, may be seen by certain policy-makers as a "threat." After all, big business and private profit have been abolished there.

The U.S. government can no longer run the world as it sees fit. Since World War II, scores of new nations, supported by the USSR, have achieved independence. They demand respect and equal treatment. A majority of humanity has gone on record for an end to the inequality between nations induced in great part by the exploitative policies of U.S. transnational corporations. The old colonialism has been defeated. The day when foreign governments rose and fell on cue from London, or Washington

and Wall Street, is passing. Further, the USSR has assisted, and identified with, anti-colonial movements and the fight for a new international economic order. The deep, gnawing suspicions of Soviet foreign policy now held by U.S. leaders seem to flow directly from their hostility to these developments.

In supporting liberation movements while negotiating arms control, the Soviets violated "the code of detente," according to national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski in 1978. He was not the only policymaker to speak of Soviet breaches of a "code" of negotiation and international behavior. In 1984, arms negotiator Edward Rowny, a Reagan appointee, mentioned the "fundamental differences" in "moral values" that made our negotiations with them so difficult: "We do not share the same goals and objectives."

The Cold War rationale for our failure to reach arms control agreements has indeed resurfaced in the period of Reaganism. Its justification then and now holds that the Soviets cannot be treated like normal people, that their system and beliefs have placed them outside of civilization, that we owe them nothing, not even common decency.

When Nikita Khrushchev visited Los Angeles in 1959, all but a handful of Hollywood's biggest stars attended a reception at 20th Century Fox. Singer-actor Nat King Cole was "fascinated" and thought the visit "was a good thing"; Danny Thomas attended, if only to show that Americans could be cordial; Art Linkletter, Raymond Burr, Janet Leigh, Jimmy Durante, Marilyn Monroe, Natalie Wood, and Glenn Ford joined the throng. But not actor Ronald Reagan. He commented to the

press on the welcome accorded the Soviet leader by President Eisenhower: "The President erred in asking Americans to accept Krushchev's visit as a friendly gesture. This nation does not have the moral obligation to repay the courtesy extended [to] Vice-President Nixon in Russia." <sup>7</sup>

In 1983, the Soviet interception of Korean Airline Flight 007 proved, in President Reagan's opinion, "how different the Soviets' concept of truth and international cooperation is from that of the rest of the world." For him, the Soviet response had challenged "the moral precepts which guide human relations among people everywhere." <sup>8</sup> However, it is now clear that the official U.S. version of the tragic 007 flight is "a disintegrating story" (Tom Wicker, *New York Times*, 9/3/85 and 9/6/85.) The full truth has not been told, and it is the Reagan administration that is stonewalling.

Reagan's anti-Sovietism rests on a long official tradition, but it is more dangerous than in the past. His antagonism to negotiation, resistance to treating the Soviet Union as an equal, refusal to accept nuclear parity, and retention of a first-strike approach leave little alternative to an arms race, which at this stage of weaponry is not only genocidal, but suicidal.



## WHAT ARE TREATIES?

"History," observed Richard Nixon, "is a pathetic junkyard of broken treaties."<sup>9</sup> One might well deduce from this cynicism and from the accusatory tone of the Reagan administration that negotiations are almost a waste of time. Negotiations must therefore become exchanges of insults, in the spirit of "getting tough" and "mincing no words," or disappear altogether in favor of an unstoppable arms race and a steadily worsening atmosphere.

Treaties are agreements that reflect generally accepted norms of relations. These norms combine to form "international law." This "law" is neither Eastern nor Western; it generalizes the expectations and experiences of all nations in their dealings with one another. When the two or more parties to a treaty have different socioeconomic systems—for example, capitalist and socialist—then the agreement constitutes a recognition of peaceful coexistence, of the legitimacy of different systems. Treaties are compromises: how else could representatives of different—in fact, opposing—approaches and ways of life reach accord? They *must* compromise.

## WHAT ARE TREATIES? 13

Before 1917, international dealings, even between rival powers, involved adherents of a similar world view and economic practices. With the birth of the Soviet Union, something new was added. Treaties between the USSR and capitalist countries represented a meeting of different approaches, without common philosophical perspectives. Treaties today cannot and do not reflect ideological convergence between the systems, but rather compromises, in conformity with generally agreed rules of conduct.

There are different kinds of treaties: bilateral, multilateral, regional, trade, non-aggression, mutual assistance. Broader agreements like the League of Nations Covenant, the United Nations Charter, and the U.N. Genocide Convention are also treaties; they promote an international climate of trust and responsibility that follows from the principles of normal state-to-state relations. Whatever form a treaty takes, it usually reflects each participant's foreign policy and understanding of its own longer range self-interest. Foreign policy itself reveals a great deal about a nation's domestic affairs, how its economy works, the nature of its prevailing ideas.

It might be useful to review what treaties used to be like. There was a time when the great powers considered war as normal a condition as peace, and in fact exerted far more energy in regulating the former than in preserving the latter. Efforts at regulating international conduct gave the strong impression that war was simply one of a number of normal human activities. The signers of the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration recognized the utility of war in weakening the "military force of the enemy." For this, "it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men"; but the use of weapons which

*compounded* their "sufferings" was considered excessive, "contrary to the laws of humanity."

Likewise, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 called for restricting certain types of weapons, while also stipulating "the laws and customs of war on land." The 1907 Convention recommended that warring nations not bomb each other's hospitals, monuments, and cultural centers, but rather inform each other in advance of "the presence of such buildings or places" and "indicate" them with "distinctive and visible signs."<sup>10</sup>

Establishing spheres of influence, carving up territories, creating protectorates governed under colonial law, and instituting inequality are all features of the treaties of the past. "Unfair" does not suffice to describe the Treaty of Nanking (1842), which gave Hong Kong to Britain. "Unequal" fails to convey the dissection of Europe and the Near East accomplished at the Congress of Berlin (1878): as if the dominant powers were playing Monopoly. Britain acquired Cyprus, France took Tunis, Austria received Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia was reduced in size, and Bulgaria was cut into thirds.

Or take the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903, in which Panama granted to the U.S. "in perpetuity the use, occupation and control of a zone of land and land under water" for the soon-to-be-built canal. The treaty authorized American military defense of the Canal Zone and made the U.S. government the guarantor of Panamanian "neutrality."

"Might makes right" suffused international law in those days, though before WWII, the USSR had been signing agreements with capitalist countries based on the equality of the partners. But deep changes in the norms of international conduct were yet to come. The victory over fascism in the Second World War witnessed the

emergence of a community of socialist countries. The period saw as well the rise and intensification of independence movements, signaling the demise of British, French, Belgian, Portuguese, Dutch, Italian and Japanese colonialism.

Needless to say, the emergent countries developed their own approach to treaties, devising foreign policies conforming to their new status and needs. Treaties began to express the new circumstances.

Today's international law, reflected first and foremost in the United Nations Charter, is pro-peace and anti-colonial. The multitude of Declarations, Conventions, and bilateral and multilateral agreements increasingly recognize equality and sovereignty as basic principles. Territorial integrity, non-interference in domestic affairs, peaceful coexistence, and the right to independence are now encoded in the fundamental statutes of international law.

At the conferences that planned the structure of the U.N. in 1945, key debates centered on independence and equality. It was agreed that the relations among member states "shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality" (Article 78 U.N. Charter). It was agreed that the U.N. would promote "higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development," and would encourage respect for "human rights and fundamental freedoms . . . without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion" (Art. 55).

Where previous international law had been mainly the province of the most developed states, the post-war changes opened up the global debates to everyone. This did not happen overnight; British and French colonialism, for example, strongly resisted the independence strug-



gles, but they, too, finally recognized the sovereignty and equality of peoples hitherto deemed "unfit" for self-rule.<sup>11</sup>

The international law that reflects today's reality has produced majority votes in the United Nations affirming peace and freedom on such issues as nuclear testing, colonialism, Palestinian rights, and apartheid, eliciting cries of protest from the representatives of the old ways. Readers may recall that some U.S. ambassadors to the U.N. described the trend in the General Assembly as "tyranny of the majority." Upholders of the former international law had never before confronted this majority as an effective opposition. During the 1960s, our government toyed with the idea of proposing *weighted voting* in the U.N., to balance out the unmistakable prevailing winds, but found no solution.<sup>12</sup>

In sum, sovereignty and equality—and above all the coexistence of countries with different social systems—have become the rule in international relations. But there are always exceptions to the rule; presently, the Reagan administration's attempts to tell other nations how to live, with a willingness to instruct them by force.

## SOVIET TREATIES: 1917-1939

Because it had adopted a different social system, the Soviet Union introduced into its foreign relations a new concept of state-to-state relations. In contrast to the tsarist tradition of power and "diktat," Lenin conceived a policy of living side-by-side with capitalist countries. For that to succeed, a minimum of mutual respect and mutual recognition of equality—which in this case meant acceptance by the others of the Soviets' right to choose their own road—had to develop.

From the start, Soviet policy emphasized this point. The new government's first measure, the Decree on Peace, called for ending World War I with a "just and democratic peace," and the independence of colonized peoples. Lenin repeatedly stressed that sections of the old tsarist treaties that sanctioned annexation and indemnity would be annulled. In this regard, he declared on November 8, 1917:

We shall not bind ourselves by treaties. We shall not allow ourselves to be entangled by treaties. We reject all clauses on plunder and violence, but we shall welcome all clauses

containing provisions for good-neighborly relations and all economic agreements; we cannot reject these.<sup>13</sup>

Asking in 1921, "Is the existence of a socialist republic in a capitalist environment conceivable in general?" Lenin answered that life had proven it was indeed possible:

There is a force more powerful than the wishes, the will and decisions of any of the governments and classes that are hostile to us. That force is the world general economic relations, which compel them to make contact with us.<sup>14</sup>

"Peaceful coexistence" with peoples everywhere was the preferred Soviet policy.<sup>15</sup>

But peaceful coexistence was not the aim of the Western powers. In the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, ending hostilities with Germany in 1918, Lenin's government was forced to give up one-third of the crop area and over half the country's industrial base. Fourteen nations, including the USA, Britain, Poland and Japan, invaded Russia in 1918 and 1919 to overthrow the Bolsheviks. Among the agreements ending the intervention was the Treaty of Riga (1921) in which the young Soviet state surrendered to Poland vast sections of Byelorussia and the Ukraine. The USSR would have to "violate" that treaty in 1939, for reasons that will soon be discussed. (Significantly, in demanding from the Soviet republic the territories in question, Poland itself was violating the treaty that had ended World War I—the Treaty of Versailles (1919)—which had drawn Poland's eastern border at the so-called Curzon Line.)<sup>16</sup>

As Soviet relations with other countries unfolded in the period before World War II, there was important progress, along with setbacks. The accusations of Soviet

violations of treaty obligations go back to the earliest days, so an examination of several of those agreements is in order.

Driven by the need to revitalize industry and reduce unemployment, Great Britain signed a major trade agreement with the Soviet Union in 1921. The first Soviet treaty with a major power obliged the signers to refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs. Trade was to be conducted on mutually favorable terms. Lenin said: "The agreement with Britain was that of a Socialist Republic with a bourgeois state. . . . Thanks to this agreement we have forced open a window of sorts."

Soon, however, charges of Soviet violations began to fly. Notwithstanding Soviet denials, British statesmen and financial leaders contended that the powerful British labor and left-wing movements were under Soviet direction and hence the Soviets were interfering in British internal affairs. They also charged that its socialist economy made the USSR an unreliable trade partner. If the Soviets reestablished private property, stated the British bankers' association in the *London Times* (April 26, 1924), then trade might proceed with less "risk." And Britain also made it clear that it regarded Soviet sympathy for liberation movements in British-dominated countries (like Afghanistan) as interference in British "internal" affairs.

In October 1924, the British press published the "Zinoviev Letter". It purported to be "orders from Moscow" to British Communists on how to control the Labor Party. When, in 1926, Soviet trade unions showed solidarity with striking British miners by sending financial assistance, the British government again protested that they considered this a violation of the non-interference



clause. While the Soviet government answered that the unions, not the state, had sent the money, it was clear that a break was imminent.

The break in relations came in 1927. Claiming that local discontent was Soviet inspired, the British government accused the Soviets of undermining British institutions. The Soviets rejected the charges, noting that Britain:

had always interpreted the Soviet Government's independent eastern policy, which openly proclaimed the sovereignty and independence of a number of eastern states and the legitimacy of their demand for equality with other countries, as anti-British propaganda. In this term it has included every manifestation of sympathy with oppressed peoples and classes, not only by the Soviet Government, but by private organizations in the USSR.<sup>17</sup>

Unable to come to grips with popular movements in their own countries during the early years of Soviet power, other governments fished out red herrings of Soviet interference in their internal affairs. Accusing the Soviets of violating treaty obligations, Mexico broke off diplomatic relations in 1930, six years after their inception. "Communist intrigue" by forces acting "on the orders of Moscow" was the specific reason given.<sup>18</sup>

When the U.S. recognized the USSR in 1933, critics saw the very existence of the Communist Party, USA as constituting a violation of the U.S.-Soviet pledge to refrain from propaganda, interference, or other efforts to overthrow each other's institutions (although the U.S. Communist Party was founded in 1919). Once more assuming that discontent in the USA could not possibly be rooted in real problems, critics blamed the Soviet Union for the emergence of strong labor and progressive trends

here in the 1930's, including the formation of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO).

Years later, certain quarters again charged that the Soviets were violating the 1933 promise to keep out of U.S. internal affairs. One newspaper alleged in 1956 that this very pledge had been "violated repeatedly."

Significantly, such assumptions account for a good part of the charges of Soviet violations in the period between 1917 and 1939. The thesis that "the Soviets are behind it" has been flung at every progressive current from the CIO to the civil rights movement to the demand for a nuclear freeze. That it seemed to buttress the earliest mention of Soviet "violations" suggests that the charge of non-compliance rests on a historically false foundation.<sup>19</sup>

Perhaps it was the Soviet Union that had greater cause to complain of interference in those early days, although not all of its experiences were negative. The USSR and a number of capitalist countries scored quite a few points for peaceful coexistence, without acrimony and accusations.

In the Treaty of Rapallo (1922), for instance, the USSR and Germany cancelled mutual debts (including German claims for reimbursement of properties nationalized in the USSR, and Soviet claims for WWI reparations). The pre-Hitler years witnessed broadening cooperation and a healthy trade balance. The countries treated each other as equals, despite their different social systems; charges of Soviet violations of norms of foreign relations did not appear. Contacts continued, were sustained by further treaties and credit arrangements. They suffered serious disruption with the rise of Hitler.<sup>20</sup>

After a war with tsarist Russia and an invasion of

Soviet Russia, Japan also reached agreement with the USSR. The treaty of 1925 provided for the return of seized territory to the USSR and granted oil concessions to Japan in the Soviet Far East. The two sides also embarked on economic cooperation, including a fisheries agreement. This latter accord was renewed and extended several times.<sup>21</sup>

The USSR signed important treaties with developing countries, entailing mutual recognition and trade:

- Afghanistan (1921: "Russia agrees to transfer to Afghanistan the lands in the frontier areas which belonged to it in the last century").
- Turkey (1921)
- Iran (1921: "The Soviet Government declares null and void all the treaties, pacts, conventions and agreements concluded by the former tsarist government with Persia and derogatory to the rights of the Persian people").
- Mongolia (1921 and 1922)<sup>22</sup>

Normal diplomatic and economic relations were set with China in a 1924 treaty whose enactment, wrote Sun Yat-sen, came about

only thanks to the fact that Russia had renounced its former privileges in China and annulled all previous treaties that violated China's sovereignty; all that was done by Russia voluntarily and stemmed from its revolutionary principles.

Later, Chiang Kai-shek would accuse the Soviet Union of violating the treaty by recognizing the independence of the Mongolian People's Republic. Chiang hoped to annex Mongolia, a dream that he took to the grave along with the idea that he was China's true leader.<sup>23</sup>

During the pre-World War II period, the USSR signed

a number of multilateral agreements, including the Geneva protocol (1925) prohibiting the use of poisonous gases and bacteriological weapons, the Kellogg-Briand pact (1928) renouncing the use of war to settle conflicts, and the Montreux Convention of 1936. Strangely, Reagan's 1984 report on Soviet "violations" alleges that the USSR has broken the Montreux Convention's prohibition on aircraft carriers in the Black Sea Straits. But the Montreux Convention had long since been abrogated by the Potsdam Treaty of 1945, signed by Harry Truman, Clement Attlee (Britain), and Joseph Stalin.<sup>24</sup>

### The Eve of World War II

For a brief moment, the spirit of the Kellogg-Briand pact helped promote real steps toward preventing war. Realizing a long-held aim, the USSR in the early 1930's initialed non-aggression pacts with several capitalist states: Poland, Finland, France and Romania. The pacts considered attempts "to settle territorial or other disputes . . . by violent means" to be violations. Changing conditions, however, would soon find a sharp rise in anti-Soviet hostility among European governments, casting doubt upon the pacts and the spirit of apparent reciprocity, and ultimately forcing the Soviet Union to take protective measures in 1939 that many have considered outright transgressions of the Finnish and Polish accords.<sup>25</sup>

The 1920s and '30s saw the rise of fascism, with genocidal consequences for the human race. Predicated on anti-Communist, racist, and anti-labor dogma, fascism from Italy to Germany to Japan glorified war as the "final solution." "Fascism," wrote Benito Mussolini,



"believes neither in the possibility nor the utility of perpetual peace. . . . War also brings up to its highest tension all human energy and puts the stamp of nobility upon the peoples who have the courage to meet it."

Indeed, Hitler mused in *Mein Kampf*, "in eternal warfare mankind has become great—in eternal peace mankind would be ruined." Through war, he continued, Germany might realize "a sound territorial policy," to wit: "the winning of new land in Europe itself. . . . If we speak of land in Europe today we can only think in the first instance of Russia, and her border states."

Japanese leaders, steeped in militarism, posed war as the only answer to economic difficulties. Blaming the Soviet Union for discontent among the Japanese labor and peace movements, they spent a good part of the 1930s preparing for a confrontation with the USSR.<sup>26</sup>

"Solutions" involving repression at home and war abroad attracted the upper crust in many a European society. Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Austria and Romania were among the countries that succumbed to fascism before World War II. There too, the promotion of racism, anti-Communist concepts (and the nurturing of every national grievance, actual or imagined, into anti-Soviet vendetta) became policy, polluting the stream of continental developments. Ultimately, Hungarian, Finnish, Romanian and Italian government troops joined the Nazi invasion of the USSR in 1941.

An alarmed Soviet Union, its non-aggression bid to Japan rebuffed in 1933 and its journalists and diplomats in Germany harassed by the newly ascendant Nazis, moved quickly to propose regional treaties of "mutual assistance." They were "born of a universal sense of uncertainty and insecurity" in Europe, according to Foreign

Minister Maxim Litvinov (1934). Mutually protective agreements were signed in 1935 with Czechoslovakia and France, both likely victims of German attack. The treaties obligated the parties to consult on necessary measures in case of the threat of aggression "on the part of any European State." In expectation of Japanese attack on Mongolia, the USSR signed a mutual assistance pact with that state in 1936.<sup>27</sup>

From non-aggression to mutual assistance to collective security, the USSR favored consecutively stronger treaties against the potential Nazi thrust. Having entered the League of Nations in 1934 (whose peace-keeping purpose and potential the Soviets had previously questioned) in order to better promote "collective security," the USSR called for enforcement of the League's Covenant and recommended rapid and strong censure of the increasingly strident policies of Rome, Tokyo, and Berlin.

The USSR launched the most significant appeal for the fulfillment of treaties and in defense of peaceful solutions to the problems of the pre-World War II period. "Gentlemen," cried Maxim Litvinov before the League's 1936 convocation, "we must not close our eyes to the existing ambition for hegemony, the hegemony of the 'chosen people' whom history is supposed to have appointed to dominate over all other peoples, who are proclaimed inferior."<sup>28</sup>

The leaders of most major powers stood by (infected with the anti-Communist bug), paralyzing the League. (The United States, not a League member, also abstained from involvement.) Despite the Nazis' selfish aims vis-a-vis not only the USSR but all of Europe, a number of Western leaders may well have empathized with Hitler

aide Albert Speer when he heard the Fuehrer's anti-Soviet fulminations.<sup>29</sup>

. . . We were not just a gang of world conquerors babbling nonsense about master races and subhumans. Inside many of us the notion of something akin to a European crusade also subsisted: for the first time in a millenium and a half the tide was flowing the other way, with Europe moving toward Asia.

Subsequently, the war dreams of Hitler and Mussolini came alive. In 1936, Italian troops, armed to the teeth and well-equipped, occupied Ethiopia. The USSR insisted that League statutes required the defense of Ethiopia and pointed out that the invasion made mockery of the Kellogg pact as well. An impassioned Haile Selassie appeared before the League's Assembly to demand that members live up to the Covenant, and specifically to Article 16, which declared aggression against any League member to be aggression against all. Article 16 also mandated boycotts of and sanctions against the aggressors and armed assistance to the victim. Haile Selassie declared: "It is a question of collective security; of the very existence of the League; of the trust placed by States in international treaties . . ." Only the USSR supported the Ethiopian plea for the implementation of the Covenant.

Spain was the site for another violation of the statutes of the League of Nations. The February, 1936 elections had brought a Republican government to power. In defiance, the fascist movement under Francisco Franco launched an effort to overthrow the regime. When the Italian and German governments dispatched arms and troops to Franco's side, Spain became in fact the victim

of aggression. The Spanish government turned to the League for redress under Article 16.

Alone among the major powers, the USSR upheld its obligations to the Covenant. Warning that outside intervention had qualified Spain for assistance from the League, the USSR agreed to Spain's request for military aid. When France and Britain, among others, denounced the flood of volunteers from many countries (including the USA) who went to fight on behalf of the legal government, Spain again asked that Nazi and Italian government troops be withdrawn. But by March, 1937, 60,000 Italian troops were in Spain.

By that time, both Italy and Germany had left the League. But Spain, a founder of the League and semi-permanent member of its Council, remained eligible for League support. Moreover, Covenant Articles 10 and 11 obligated member-states to defend "the territorial integrity and existing political independence of Members of the League"; and, to "take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations" in the event of "war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not . . ." Still, most members opposed aid to Spain.

What would become of treaties and international conduct if such flagrant violations were allowed? Time and again, the USSR brought up that most important question in League debates. "The League," exclaimed Litvinov, "cannot wield any authority whatsoever, cannot maintain its existence, if it goes on without end shirking its obligations and registering its own helplessness." Some states clearly hoped to make the League a do-nothing body, but the USSR felt otherwise: "It should not be forgotten that the purpose of Article 16 is not only



to arrest inchoate aggression, but what is more important, to serve as a warning to the aggressor, deterring him from aggression. . . . Is it not obvious that the whole value of Article 16 lies in its obligatory character, that is, in the objective character of sanctions, which enables every Member . . . to rely on universal aid if it is attacked?"

Western nonchalance toward treaty obligations went beyond simple defiance of international law or fear of exercising the statutes. As Litvinov observed before the League's 1937 Assembly:

. . . however diversified the regimes' [Italy, Germany, and Japan] ideology, the material and cultural level of the objects of the attacks, all three States advance one and the same motive to justify aggression: the struggle against Communism. The rulers of these States naively think, or rather pretend to think, that they have only to pronounce the word "anti-Communism" and all their international wrongdoings and crimes will be forgiven.<sup>30</sup>

Litvinov's fears were confirmed. During the 1930s, anti-Communism licensed the waiving of treaty obligations by Western States and the demolition of international law.

Events now moved very quickly. "Appeasement" of Nazi and Italian encroachments became the order of the day. Germany became "Greater Germany" with the "incorporation," by force, of Austria in 1938. Hitler's demand for the Sudetenland sectors of Czechoslovakia ended with that nation's dismemberment at Munich in 1938; British Prime Minister Chamberlain and French Premier Daladier acquiesced, preserving "peace" in Europe.

The USSR was excluded from the deliberations on

the future of Europe. Small wonder then that Litvinov would rise before the League for the last time to remark: ". . . I must plainly declare here that the Soviet Government bears no responsibility whatsoever for the events now taking place, and for the fatal consequences which may inexorably ensue."<sup>31</sup>

Still another Soviet attempt was made to conclude a mutual support agreement with Britain and France. The USSR pledged to uphold its mutual assistance pact with Czechoslovakia in the event of a German invasion, but with the Nazi entry into Prague in March, 1939, the Soviets found the other powers quite unwilling to join in defense of that country; the USSR was in no position to confront the onrushing Nazis alone.<sup>32</sup>

In March, April, June, and August, the Soviet Union reiterated the appeal for a mutual aid pact with Britain and France. Prime Minister Chamberlain termed the proposal "premature" in March and confided a "most profound distrust of Russia." In response to the concept of joint defense of Poland and other states on the German border from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, French and British leaders agreed to defend the border states and welcomed Soviet aid in case of Nazi assaults upon France and Britain, but refused to promise assistance to the Soviets if Germany attacked the USSR. Polls showed that 90 percent of the British people dissented from the Chamberlain-Daladier stance, preferring instead a solid mutual aid treaty. Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, David Lloyd George and other statesmen found the British government's outlook shortsighted: they, too, demanded an equitable French-Soviet-British alliance against the Nazis. An accord that bound the Soviets to defend the others, but not vice-versa, was unacceptable. The USSR, de-

clared a Soviet representative, refused "to become a plaything in the hands of people who like others to pull chestnuts out of the fire for them."<sup>33</sup>

Not until August, 1939, did British and French delegations arrive in Moscow—supposedly to negotiate an alliance. They had traveled by boat, taking their time. It was known then, and British documents have since confirmed, that these delegations consisted entirely of subordinate officials who had no mandate to reach an accord.

German troops massed on the Polish border; invasion plans had been conceived as early as the previous spring. Nazi Field Marshal Keitel would later remember that the September 1 invasion date had been set in May. Poland's leaders, themselves anti-Communist, rebuffed a mutual aid pact with the USSR that would have placed Soviet troops in Poland in advance of the looming Nazi aggression. Instead, Poland concluded a defense agreement with Britain, supported by France; but an accord without Soviet participation assured Poland of no viable security against the Nazis.<sup>34</sup>

The USSR was faced with mounting evidence of the slippery world of European diplomacy. The Germans were heading East; Nazi and Fascist actions in Spain, Ethiopia, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Albania (seized by Italy in April) had been appeased; all sense of mutuality and joint anti-Nazi action to stave off war had been thrown to the winds by Western leaders; anti-Communist Polish leaders appeared to fear Soviet defense aid more than Nazi attack. On the eve of Nazi invasion, the bulk of the Polish armed forces were deployed on the Polish-Soviet border.

To protect itself, the USSR signed the famous non-aggression treaty with Germany on August 23, 1939. No Soviet treaty experience has been more discussed or dis-

torted. It has been characterized as a supreme example of unscrupulous, unprincipled, self-serving Communist power politics.

The non-aggression treaty bound the two sides to "refrain from any act of force" against each other; to join no hostile action against either country by a third party; to settle any disputes between them "exclusively by peaceful means."<sup>35</sup>

As planned since May, German troops invaded Poland on September 1, hindered mildly by the defenses now offered the victims by France and Britain. With Polish troops concentrated on the Soviet border, the Nazi juggernaut sped quickly across the country.

It has been charged that the Soviet Union at that point fulfilled its end of the bargain and, with Polish democracy drowning, sent its troops into Poland.

But there was no Nazi-Soviet "alliance." Soviet opposition to Nazism had been manifested without parallel during the 1930s, consecrated in blood on the fields of Spain. Non-aggression was just that, born of the Western appeasement of fascism which the Soviet Union had resisted every tragic step of the way. The treaty supplied the Soviets with the oxygen of time before the inevitable Nazi invasion of the USSR, about which Hitler had long raved.

The facts indicate that a persisting German-Soviet antipathy made the non-aggression treaty increasingly shaky. When Soviet troops entered Poland three weeks after the Nazi invasion, they did so, Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov explained, to protect Soviet borders from the onrushing Germans: "Poland has become a fertile field for any accidental and unexpected contingency that may create a menace to the Soviet Union."

Moreover, Byelorussians and Ukrainians lived in the



Polish lands the Soviet troops occupied as Nazi forces sped east—for that section of Eastern Poland had been taken from Russia by the Treaty of Riga (1921). The USSR went into Poland only up to the Curzon Line, the Polish-Russian border set by the Treaty of Versailles (1919).

Winston Churchill, soon to be Prime Minister of Great Britain, cut to the nub of the matter of Soviet "complicity" with Nazi aggression: "... That the Russians should stand on this line was clearly necessary for the safety of Russia against the Nazi menace. At any rate, the line is there, and an Eastern front has been created which Nazi Germany dare not assail." He felt the Western leaders had imperiled their own nations by giving Hitler and Mussolini far too much rope, allowing the fascists to work up a head of steam that rendered the British-French support for Poland, when it finally came, almost useless. Despite his antipathy to socialism, Churchill had argued long and hard for a mutual aid treaty with the USSR. He was none too impressed with the sympathy expressed for Poland as a victim of Soviet duplicity. Afterward he recalled that every Soviet plea for anti-Nazi defense had been spurned, and now, Churchill stated:

When every one of these aids and advantages has been squandered and thrown away, Great Britain advances, leading France by the hand to guarantee the integrity of Poland—of that very Poland which with hyena appetite had only six months before joined in the pillage and destruction of the Czechoslovak State. There was sense in fighting for Czechoslovakia in 1938, when the German Army could scarcely put up a half a dozen trained divisions on the Western Front, when the French with nearly sixty or seventy divisions could most certainly have rolled forward across the Rhine or into the Ruhr. But this had been judged unreasonable, rash, below the level of mod-

ern intellectual thought and morality. Yet now at last the two Western democracies declared themselves ready to stake their lives upon the territorial integrity of Poland. History . . . may be scoured and ransacked to find a parallel to this sudden and complete reversal of five or six years' policy of easy-going placatory appeasement, and its transformation almost over-night into a readiness to accept an obviously imminent war on far worse conditions and on the greatest scale.<sup>36</sup>

Finally, there is evidence of Nazi puzzlement or dismay at the Soviet entry into Poland.

General Nicolaus von Vormann recalled rage in Hitler's headquarters at the news of the Soviet move; a decision to confront the Soviets then and there was debated, then tabled. Nazi troops in fact then retreated from their positions in Eastern Poland.<sup>37</sup>

Even as France and Britain "opposed" German and Italian forces in the famous "phony," quiet stage of the war (1939-1941), Soviet relations with Germany went downhill. A month after Hitler's takeover of Poland, the USSR moved to fortify itself against Nazi attack. It asked Finland for a naval base and for a section of land across the Gulf of Finland from highly vulnerable Leningrad, offering twice as much territory in return.

Military historian B. H. Liddell Hart, not one to conceal his anti-Soviet proclivities, found the Soviet proposal "rational" and unthreatening "to the security of Finland," intended in fact to hinder "the use of Finland as a jumping-off point for any German attack on Russia." The Finnish leaders, headed by the openly pro-Nazi Mannerheim, demurred, and the two sides went to war in late 1939.

And now, finally, the League of Nations (that in vain Spain and Ethiopia had looked to for support) in-

voked the Covenant and expelled the Soviet Union, for indeed a treaty had been broken.

In compassionate union, German, Italian, French and British volunteers, and officially donated weaponry, freed now of "phony war" disuse, arrived in "Little Finland." Money flooded to the Finns from official and unofficial sources. In the United States, Herbert Hoover, (champion of the disadvantaged!) headed up the relief effort.

Ultimately, the Soviet Union triumphed and realized its proposals. No shrinking violets, however, the Finnish government signed an agreement with the Nazis in October, 1940, allowing the stationing of German troops in Finland. Along with Finnish battalions, those troops later invaded the USSR.<sup>38</sup>

Thus, it was not long after the German-Soviet treaty that antagonisms flared between the two. German claims on Bulgaria and Romania, surfacing in September 1940, elicited official Soviet rebuke. Even earlier, in fact, according to Nazi Field Marshal Keitel, Hitler's plans for invading the USSR had begun taking shape. For, as the Fuehrer declared a year after the non-aggression treaty, he "had never lost sight of the inevitability of a clash between the world's two most diametrically opposed ideologies . . ." The Germans deployed over a half million troops on the "Eastern front" during the period of the non-aggression pact (while the "phony war" went on in the West). Violations of Soviet airspace proliferated. In February, 1941, Russo-German phrase books began appearing in Berlin including such expressions as: "Where is the collective farm chairman?" "Are you a Communist?" "Hands up!" "I'll shoot!" "Surrender."<sup>39</sup>

How useful those phrases would soon become!

## WORLD WAR II: YALTA AND POTSDAM

When the Nazi army invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, an actual anti-Hitler coalition finally began to form. Leaders of Britain and the USSR, soon joined by the United States, initiated a process of consultation, joint strategy and assistance. Born of a growing consensus that the defeat of Hitler would serve the interests of all, this anti-Hitler coalition evolved over a period of time.

An important new stage in U.S.-Soviet relations began. True, there had been trade before, and long-overdue diplomatic relations had opened in 1933. Exchanges had taken place, with receptivity on both sides, serving to reduce somewhat the bitter memories of U.S. intervention in 1919 and later U.S. charges of Soviet violations of diplomatic norms and "interference" in U.S. domestic affairs.<sup>40</sup> On the popular level in our country, trade union, liberal and left-wing pressure for normalization of relations had never really let up, but rather had intensified. Then too, President Roosevelt was known to



have questioned the appeasement orientation of British and French leaders in the 1930s. Distancing himself from other key men of influence, FDR in 1937 had asserted that "war is a contagion," that "when an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community."<sup>41</sup>

There remained powerful opponents of cooperation with the USSR during the 30s (and 40s) as we have indicated. Despite such obstacles, U.S.-Soviet ties had developed.

The Second World War produced a cooperation between the USA, Great Britain and the Soviet Union that was unprecedented in Soviet experience with capitalist countries; it also proved essential in defeating Germany, Italy, and Japan. Now, U.S., Soviet and British representatives were hammering out common war aims and post-war goals. Their views were not identical. As equals, they negotiated and prepared the destruction of Hitler's forces and of the Japanese military machine. In their agreements they worked out a plan for the extirpation of nazism and fascism, and for a new world organization.

The most important of these agreements are known by the names of the cities where they were discussed and signed: Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam. Few, if any, international accords or treaties have ever precipitated the thunder of condemnation that these have, particularly among our own Cold Warriors in government and media. To them the very word "Yalta" denotes American acquiescence to Soviet expansionism. An epithet among arms race crusaders, "Yalta" rationalizes "getting tough" with, and never trusting, "the Russians." It embodies all characterizations of the USSR's alleged dishonest attitude to treaties.

An examination of these agreements must begin with the fact that the Soviet Union bore the brunt of World War II. Fascism vented its inhumanity upon France, Britain, China, Indochina, the Philippines, the Netherlands, Poland, all of Europe; upon the soldiers of the United States and of all the Allies: it reserved special atrocities for the Jews. No country, as such, however, suffered like the Soviet Union.

Nazi pillage of the USSR is beyond comprehension: 20 million deaths, twice as many homeless, untold millions wounded; 70,000 villages, 98,000 collective farms, 1,710 towns, and fifteen large cities destroyed; 31,850 factories, 65,000 kilometers of railroad track, 56,000 miles of highway, 90,000 bridges, 3,000 oil wells demolished; seven million horses, twenty million hogs, 27 million sheep and goats, 17 million cattle, 110 million poultry wiped out; 40,000 hospitals, 84,000 schools, 43,000 public libraries, 44,000 theaters, and 427 museums razed to the ground.

"Terrible memories of this kind," wrote Professor D. F. Fleming, "cannot die. . . . Without a keen understanding of the deepest and strongest psychological urge left by that war. . . . we can never understand how the Russians feel about Germany, and Eastern Europe, i.e., about the main element in the Cold War."<sup>42</sup>

Among the nations of the anti-Hitler alliance (including the United States), support for "our Soviet ally" became the broadest expression of anti-Nazi commitment. In our country, Russian War Relief raised tens of millions of dollars in goods, supplies, medicines, clothing and cash. Millions of Americans of all races and beliefs devoted time and work for that purpose. Seven thousand garment workers marched in a "Parade of Clothes" in New York, loading four truckloads for the

Soviet Union; a Women's Christian Temperance Union group in a small Ohio town sold produce to raise money; and YMCA's became collection centers. Cultural figures—among them Charlie Chaplin, Duke Ellington, Douglas Fairbanks, Jr., John Garfield, Benny Goodman, Helen Hayes, Jascha Heifetz, Vladimir Horowitz, Burgess Meredith, Eugene O'Neill, Basil Rathbone, Paul Robeson, Orson Welles and Teddy Wilson—turned out at parties, concerts, dances, dinners and rallies before hundreds of thousands. A spectrum of politicians spoke out: Fiorello LaGuardia, Adam Clayton Powell, Wendell Willkie, Henry Wallace; scientists, among them George Washington Carver and Albert Einstein, expressed support; fur, construction, bakers', electrical, painters', machinists', steel, longshore, auto and carpenters' locals forwarded support; bankers, insurance executives and businessmen joined committees, and clergymen of all faiths assisted "our Soviet ally."<sup>43</sup>

The West's leading spokesmen acknowledged Soviet wartime sacrifices, particularly the decisive blow struck against the Nazis at Stalingrad (1943). "The hopes of civilization rest on the worthy banners of the courageous Red Army," declared General Douglas MacArthur. The USSR "sustained losses which no country or government has ever borne in so short a time and lived," Winston Churchill stated. The Soviets, wrote Roosevelt, "have destroyed and are destroying more armed power of our enemies—troops, planes, tanks and guns—than all the other United Nations put together."<sup>44</sup>

### Tehran

It was in this context that Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt gathered in Tehran, Iran, in November 1943. After

debate, Spring of 1944 was agreed upon for the opening of the long-awaited western front against the Nazis. Stalin pledged that the USSR would enter the war against Japan three months after the defeat of Germany, an announcement to which "the President and the Chiefs of Staff attached the greatest importance," according to General John R. Deane.

Discussion also touched upon the future of Germany and Poland. FDR proposed that Germany be divided into six independent states. Stalin felt this unnecessary: the matter was shelved. A number of representatives of the Polish government-in-exile in London were spending more time attacking the partisans than the Nazis; Stalin believed that the London Poles should be excluded from a future leadership role in Poland, but Churchill strongly dissented. This, too, was held in abeyance.

Though the subject of Nazi war criminals arose informally, important differences emerged. Stalin's toast "to the swiftest possible justice for all Germany's war criminals, to our unity in dispatching them as fast as we capture them, all of them," brought Churchill indignantly to his feet: "Any such attitude is wholly contrary to our British sense of justice! The British people will never stand for such mass murder. . . . I feel most strongly that no one, Nazi or no, shall be summarily dealt with, before a firing squad, without proper legal trial, no matter what the known facts and proven evidence against him!" (The Soviets, too, supported trials and participated in the Nuremberg tribunals; but Western justice, particularly as administered by U.S. authorities, would prove unusually kind to Nazi war criminals: soon many found sanctuary and employment in the United States, including in strategic positions.)

However, disagreements could not detract from the



conference proceedings and anti-fascist decisions, from the developing collaboration of the Big Three. The most significant result, of course, was the agreement on D-Day. The Tehran communique declared, "Our attack will be relentless." The coordinated, two-front anti-fascist sweep, based on cooperation and joint action was in motion.<sup>45</sup>

Several months later, consulting in Moscow with Stalin on post-war Europe, Churchill proposed a deal for the division of Europe into tentative spheres of control. He suggested that the Soviets should have "ninety percent dominance in Rumania," while Britain assumed "ninety percent of the say in Greece"; the USSR and Britain might "go fifty-fifty about Yugoslavia." Churchill then jotted down the percentages on a piece of paper which he handed to Stalin:

Rumania:	Russia	90%
	The others	10%
Greece:	Great Britain	90%(in accord with USA)
	Russia	10%
Yugoslavia	50-50%	
Hungary	50-50%	
Bulgaria:	Russia	75%
	The others	25%

Stalin paused, then "took his blue pencil and made a large tick upon it, and passed it back to us." Churchill recalled: "It was all settled in no more time than it takes to set down."

He asked Stalin, "Might it not be thought rather cynical if it seemed we had disposed of these issues, so fateful to millions of people, in such an offhand manner?"

Let us burn the paper." Stalin answered, "No, you keep it."<sup>46</sup>

So goes the folklore, and thus, Europe's future shape was outlined, the appeasement of Soviet appetites approved by the West. The Cold War fairy tale has it that Europe was divided, the will of peoples ignored. Evidence suggests, however, that despite Churchill's proposal, no such deal was made. Soviet interpreter Valentin Berezhkov, who was present, writes that Stalin "glanced at the page and gave it back to Churchill" after which Sir Winston offered to burn it.<sup>47</sup>

U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Averell Harriman also disputes the allegation of a deal on "percentages" of influence. He remembers that Churchill's subsequent draft of a joint cable to Roosevelt (October 10, 1944) stated, "We have to consider the best way of reaching an agreed policy about the Balkan countries including Hungary and Turkey *having regard to our varying duties toward them*" (emphasis added), the latter phrase implying spheres of influence. But Stalin refused to sign that cable, and (recalls Harriman) those words were deleted at his insistence. Harriman told Stalin that FDR would appreciate the deletion, for the President would not want such things decided in his absence. The former ambassador writes:

I don't understand . . . just what Churchill thought he was accomplishing by these percentages. I know that he wanted a free hand in Greece, with the support of the United States and that he wanted to have a hand in the development of the new Yugoslav Government, combining the government-in-exile with Tito and his group. Churchill certainly knew that Roosevelt insisted on keeping a free hand and wanted any decision deferred until

the three could meet together. The interesting thing is that when they did meet at Yalta, the question of percentages was never again raised.<sup>48</sup>

Indeed, Churchill's famous piece of paper has remained in private hands, never becoming an official document. In the actual documents and accords of the anti-Hitler coalition—all of which have been published—no mention of a deal on dividing Europe can be found.

### Yalta

Nevertheless, the same charge of European partition, in defiance of the peoples' right to determine their own destiny, has suffused prevailing notions in our country about that most significant of wartime meetings, the conference at Yalta. Held in February, 1945, during the closing stage of the war, the meeting drew Churchill, Stalin and FDR together for the last time; Roosevelt died in April.

Anti-Yalta assumptions have turned on two points, stressing two apparently contradictory charges that have echoed after almost every treaty signed by the Soviet Union over the last 40 years: the Soviets manipulate negotiations to get what they want; or, they break treaties that are not to their liking. For Yalta, one hears either that the treaty was unfair from the start, imposed by the Soviets upon the fading Roosevelt, or that it was a fair treaty but has been violated by the Soviet Union.

Thus, Richard Nixon writes that at Yalta Roosevelt learned "with tragic consequences for the people of Poland and the other nations behind the Iron Curtain," that neither "personal persuasiveness" nor "charm" could

change the Kremlin's policies. In August 1984, President Reagan rejected an interpretation of the Yalta accord "that suggested American consent for the division of Europe into spheres of influence." He added that we would not passively accept "the permanent subjugation of the people of Eastern Europe." While the 1952 Republican platform had called for "repudiation" of the Yalta agreements (which allegedly aided "Communist enslavement"), Reagan in 1984 declared he would "press for full compliance" with Yalta. The president termed the accord "a pledge" by the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain to "restore full independence, and to allow free elections in all countries liberated from the Nazis after World War II."

The United States, stated right-wing Congressmen in 1953, should "nullify" the pact, which "gave Stalin a seemingly legal stranglehold on his conquests." The United States could not accept the Soviet proposal for a non-aggression treaty in 1956 because "it would appear to give moral sanction to the status quo in Europe, with Germany still divided and the countries of Eastern Europe still under Moscow's domination."

Repeatedly during the 1950s, U.S. spokesmen demanded that the USSR "observe" the Yalta agreement to allow "free elections" in Eastern Europe. "Soviet intransigence" had "caused the division of Germany and of Europe," opined the *Wall Street Journal*. "Moscow," stated the *New York Herald Tribune* in 1965, had "dishonored its pledge . . ."<sup>49</sup>

Today, veteran observer C. L. Sulzberger also evokes the theme of power politics when he says that the statesmen gathered in Yalta's "imperial holiday palaces to bargain over the world's future shape," and that at Yalta, Stalin was wont to "double-cross" Poland, a practice he



enjoyed. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the greatest hawk of the Carter administration, believes today that "the disassociation of the United States from the legacy of Yalta would be a historically significant step particularly at this stage."<sup>50</sup>

Not coincidentally, certain critics of Yalta claimed that the U.S. delegation to the conference had been infiltrated by "Communists." Among the delegates was State Department official Alger Hiss, later a victim of McCarthyite frame-up. Surely, it has been said, the "Soviet agent" Hiss affected the outcome of the talks. Joe McCarthy put it in a nutshell: "We know that at Yalta we were betrayed."<sup>51</sup>

### What did happen at Yalta?

The Allies made plans for the final assault on Nazi Germany. Their offensive would end only with Germany's unconditional surrender. Military coordination became stronger. Temporary zones of occupation of Germany were agreed upon. Britain, the USA and the USSR pledged to disarm and disband German armed forces and to break up the Nazi military apparatus. They were determined to "wipe out the Nazi party, Nazi laws, organizations, and institutions, remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public office and from the cultural and economic life of the German people . . ." The Allies approved the USSR's pledge to enter the war against Japan within two or three months of Germany's defeat. The three powers called for the founding of the United Nations. They promised to maintain "unity for peace as for war," to develop their cooperation and understanding.

The leaders agreed that peace and order in post-war Europe demanded the elimination of "the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism" from the newly-liberated countries. The peoples of those countries would have the right to "create democratic institutions of their own choice," in keeping with "sovereign rights" and "self-government."

"Free elections" would occur in the liberated countries; meanwhile "interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements" would preside. Likewise, such breadth would mark electoral participation.

But fascist-oriented parties and groups would not be allowed to take part in governments and elections. On Poland, different views emerged among the three discussants. Still, they agreed that the partisan-created "Provisional Government" should be "reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad." A commission of three, one from each major power, would oversee this process.

In his exhaustive study, *From Yalta to Disarmament*, observer J. P. Morray concludes that the Yalta agreement: (a) excluded from Polish democratization any leaders who did not endorse the Yalta decisions. Among upper and middle-class Poles, there were pre-war leaders who were bitterly anti-partisan and who claimed certain Soviet territory to be Polish. But the Yalta conference set the Polish-Soviet border at the *Curzon Line* (as had been established by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919); (b) required the aforementioned commission to work on the principle of unanimity of the three major powers; (c) recognized the partisan-backed Provisional government as the starting point for the new regime, to be augmented

by other leaders who supported the Yalta accord. The left-led Provisional regime, vehemently anti-Nazi, was not put on the same footing as the other "democratic" forces who might join in its "reorganization," but rather constituted the basis for the new authority.

Surely, there were different opinions, but both FDR and Churchill agreed during the conference that the new Poland should not allow the participation in government of groups hostile to the USSR. "A Poland friendly to Russia," said Churchill, not one "that would be inimical to your interests," as FDR put it to Stalin, was the consensus opinion.

To learn from the European and worldwide holocaust experience, predicated on anti-Sovietism, was to promote renewal in Poland and elsewhere under the leadership of those who were not hostile to the USSR, who did not advocate return to the pre-war tinder-box, whose motivation in life was not anti-labor, anti-Soviet and anti-Jewish, but who rather favored an end to the mentality and policy of Hitlerism and war. With their leadership, democracy might be realized.

And when Churchill declared on April 28, 1945, that Britain would not recognize a new Polish regime that lacked "proper regard for the rights of the individual as we understand these matters in the western world," he was violating the Yalta agreement. That was *his* precondition, not the one agreed to by the Big Three.

Ultimately, the above-mentioned commission met with a range of Polish representatives and approved a Government of National Unity. Of the 21 ministries, 16 were filled by members of the partisan-established Provisional regime and five went to others.<sup>52</sup>

The Yalta agreement represented a substantial accomplishment. Divergent views had not prevented a

workable solution to the liberation and democratization of occupied Europe. Nazi occupation had induced resistance—powerful, broad partisan movements more often than not led by those most opposed to Hitlerism: Communists, Socialists, trade unionists. These movements embraced workers, farmers, small businessmen, youth, women, and substantial representation of the churches. The anti-fascist resistance had set in motion and brought into play social forces in Europe (and Asia) that could not be reversed after the war; people were instilled with a determination never to permit the financial-military backbone of fascism—native or foreign—to evolve again. The new governments that arose included all but the most conservative political trends: they were coalitions.

The Yalta agreement corresponded with, and responded to, political reality. Embittered by holocaust and genocide (and by memories of appeasement), millions of Europeans concluded that only substantial changes in the way their societies had operated could prevent the revival of local and regional Hitlerism and forestall the repetition of unspeakable tragedy. In reaching, implementing and defending such conclusions, a number of European peoples moved toward socialism. It was then that attacks upon Yalta became a veritable livelihood for Cold Warriors.

### Potsdam

The final wartime agreement of the three major allies was the Potsdam treaty, concluded outside Berlin in July-August 1945. Though one commentator avers that it "was not a vital conference," the Potsdam meeting developed



the Allied approach to the future Germany; it was a most important, and indeed "vital" conference.<sup>53</sup>

FDR had died in April; Harry Truman met with Stalin and Churchill—and Churchill's successor, Clement Attlee—at Potsdam. Truman represented a constituency opposed to cooperation with the USSR. Only a week after Roosevelt's death, Truman had harangued Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov in Washington in real "muleskinner's language" over the Polish controversy. A definite change, a souring in relations, was in evidence.

Still, on the heels of Nazi surrender, Britain, the U.S., and the USSR, again reached accord on basic post-war matters. Potsdam went far deeper than Yalta into the destiny of Nazism. The Allies agreed that every Nazi military unit, "together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely abolished . . ."

The Nazi party would be destroyed and outlawed. All Nazi laws discriminating "on grounds of race, creed, or political opinion," would be eliminated. War criminals would be arrested and "brought to judgment." Prominent Nazi leaders would be removed from, and prevented from participation in, "public and semi-public office." Moreover, "German education" would "be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and military doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas."

New economic principles would come into force. The industrialists who had sustained Hitler's ascent, and who in turn had reaped the benefits of manufacturing war materials, including gas pellets and ovens, would be checked. The economy would "be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified in particular by

cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements." Key industries would be nationalized.

The French, Soviet, British, and American occupation zones would constitute "a single economic unit." "All democratic political parties" would be allowed to participate in local elections and government. Ultimately, a new central government would be established on the basis of the aforementioned principles.<sup>54</sup>

This agreement was the highlight of the Potsdam meeting. It represented the logical extension of the Allies' united pursuit of Nazi Germany's total defeat in the spring. Certain Western spokesmen had not been too thrilled with the Yalta understanding on that score. British military authority B. H. Liddell Hart spoke for others when he decried the Allies' full-scale onslaught in the final days of the war. Had the Western Allies not been so "unwise and short-sighted," then perhaps some modicum of conservative influence might have remained in the countries liberated from Nazism: "A complete overthrow of Germany's power of resistance was bound to clear the way for Soviet Russia's domination of the Eurasian continent, and for a vast extension of Communist power in all directions." Instead, the West should have relented at the end, softening the blow against the Nazis.<sup>55</sup>

Potsdam disappointed such men. It mandated the crushing of Nazism as practice and ideology in the wake of unconditional surrender. "De-Nazification," "de-cartelization," and "de-militarization" became the bywords of the Allied approach to Germany.

But the application of the Potsdam treaty is another story entirely.

Briefly, the principles agreed upon by Britain, the U.S., and the USSR were not applied with equal vigor

in all the zones. Though left-leaning and labor-oriented political parties rapidly became the most popular in all the zones, Nazis found opportunities to return in the western American, British, and French zones, not as termites out of the woodwork, but on two legs, walking erect, in fact almost human. In the eastern (Soviet) zone, the ideological, political, educational, and economic principles of Potsdam did come into force. The western part became, on the contrary, an instrument of the Cold War: soon, left-wing parties there were being attacked; anti-Semitism blossomed anew. Former Nazis soon acquired important posts. A "Fourth Reich" was contemplated. Leading U.S. spokesman James Byrnes demanded in 1947 that "the control of German industries . . . be turned back to the owners."

As is known, two German states developed: the Federal Republic of Germany in the west and the German Democratic Republic in the east. The constitution of the latter banned "racial, religious or national hatred, or militaristic propaganda, warmongering and all other activities directed against the principle of equal rights . . ."<sup>56</sup>

One final word about the Potsdam conference deserves mention. While the leaders met, a mushroom-shaped cloud arose over New Mexico, many thousands of miles away; the United States had tested the atomic bomb.

## ATOMIC WEAPONS AND THE COLD WAR

With the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the modern era of U.S.-Soviet relations opened. Moreover, the level and degree of arms treaty negotiations thereafter became a decisive barometer of those relations.

Numerous authorities have wondered whether the destruction of the Japanese cities served to close one war or to start another one. Reports of Japan's imminent military collapse had circulated throughout July 1945, and the Soviets had pledged at Tehran and Yalta to enter the war in Asia within three months after Germany's defeat. The use of the A-bomb early in August was thus unnecessary and a crime.

Clearly, there was another motive. Secretary of State James Byrnes had suggested as much when he informed Truman in April, 1945, that the bomb would enable the United States "to dictate our own terms at the end of the war." Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Grew believed in May 1945 that "a future war with Soviet Russia is . . .



certain," and called for preparations. U.S. General Leslie Groves, who was in charge of the Manhattan Project that produced and tested the bomb, recalled:

that there was never, from about two weeks from the time I took charge of the project, any illusion on my part but that Russia was the enemy and that the project was conducted on that basis. I didn't go along with the attitude of the whole country that Russia was a gallant ally. I always had suspicions and the project was conducted on that basis.<sup>57</sup>

The problem was, as Groves admitted, that "the whole country" did not share his views. Military cooperation, Russian War Relief, Lend-Lease, and countless expressions of aid and support for the USSR's war effort reflected the prevailing opinion. Considering Allied wartime collaboration, a firm basis existed for the assumption that friendship between our countries might continue to grow after the war. The anti-Hitler majority in the United States would not easily forget the experiences of mutual support and understanding.

The "attitude of the whole country" ran counter to the interests represented by Truman. They had balked at the prospect of Germany's unconditional surrender, preferring to see some modicum of leniency accorded the defeated Nazis. They feared that unless "wisdom" was exercised, the Allied anti-Nazi offensive might also crush the more civilized supporters of fascism, with whom they, like the pre-war appeasers, shared the values of anti-Communism.

The need for wartime unity may have overshadowed anti-Sovietism among those in power, but even during the war, many in and out of government had given thought to a different U.S.-Soviet relationship. With the war over,

liberated Europe tending leftward, and independence movements gaining in colonial Asia and Africa, the times called the upholders of yesterday into action.

After the death of Roosevelt, the anti-Soviet trends became more pronounced although they still reflected a minority opinion. They faced the then uphill job of changing the public mind. Over the next decade and a half, the American people would be bombarded with a mammoth dosage of hysteria about Soviet intentions, threats, subversion, and miscellaneous evils. The Cold War was imposed upon the peace-and-friendship majority of the American people.

The campaign struck a responsive chord among rightwing thinkers everywhere, including the Nazis on trial at Nuremberg in 1946 who, after hearing of Churchill's epochal "Iron Curtain" speech, reacted thusly:

There was tremendous excitement. Hess suddenly stopped acting the amnesiac and reminded us of how often he had predicted a great turning point that would put an end to the trial, rehabilitate all of us, and restore us to our ranks and dignities. Goering, too, was beside himself; he repeatedly slapped his thighs with his palm and boomed: "History will not be deceived! The Fuehrer and I always prophesied it! This coalition had to break up sooner or later."<sup>58</sup>

There emerged in 1945-46 the first global signs of coalitions with opposing views on atomic weapons. Initial debates took place regarding treaties to ban or limit the most fearsome and destructive weapons of all time. It should be remembered that for several years after 1945, the USA was the only country in possession of those weapons.

In June, 1946, Bernard Baruch, the U.S. delegate to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission, put forward an

arms treaty proposal which attempted to perpetuate exclusive U.S. ownership of the bomb. The Baruch Plan started a tradition of proposals premised on inequality. Baruch's sincerely phrased, straightforward suggestion entailed the following: the establishment of an International Atomic Development Authority composed of delegates of "proven competence;" penalties for research with "atomic material suitable for use in an atomic bomb," even if that research was for peaceful purposes; abrogation of the veto power of any permanent Security Council member on any matter pertaining to this Plan, once it was approved; an end to the production of atomic weapons; and finally, destruction of existing stockpiles only after all other terms of the proposed treaty were met.

This latter, and final, stage would come, in the words of another U.S. delegate, "only when we and all other nations can be fully assured that no one can turn atomic energy to warlike uses." Who was "we"? "We" was the United States government, for no one else had these weapons. And no one else could have them under the Baruch Plan, but "we" would keep ours in the meantime.

No, the Soviets would not sign such a treaty. The nuclear debate raged. Andrei Gromyko, on June 19, 1946, introduced a draft convention in the U.N. proposing "not to use atomic weapons in any circumstances whatsoever"; to ban manufacture and stockpiling of such weapons; "to destroy, within a period of three months from the day of the entry into force of the present convention, all stocks of atomic energy weapons whether in a finished or unfinished state;" and, that violators be severely punished.<sup>59</sup>

This contravened the view of American spokesmen epitomized so well in President Truman's, "We must

constitute ourselves trustees of this force." Monopoly of the A-bomb was the greatest instrument of pressure and intimidation in world history.

After the U.N. General Assembly recognized, in December 1946, "the necessity of an early general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces," U.S. delegates contended that any action upon reduction first required agreement on control of atomic energy as stipulated in the Baruch Plan.

International tensions rose. The chances of accord receded. In 1947, U.S. Senator Brian McMahon warned that Soviet rejection of American arms control terms itself constituted an "act of aggression."<sup>60</sup>

But in 1949, the USSR tested its first atomic weapons. Anti-Communist delirium in the influential circles of U.S. government and mass media mounted in the wake of the Soviet tests.

During the 1950s, the arms race escalated. Though he had criticized the Soviets for by-passing the Baruch Plan, veteran diplomat George Kennan nevertheless made this observation in 1981:

We must remember that it has been we Americans who, at every step of the road, have taken the lead in the development of this sort of weaponry. It was we who first produced and tested such a device; we who were the first to raise its destructiveness to a new level with the hydrogen bomb; we who introduced the multiple warhead; we who have declined every proposal for the renunciation of the principle of "first use"; and we alone, so help us God, who have used the weapons in anger against others, and against tens of thousands of helpless non-combatants at that.<sup>61</sup>

During the 1950s there were no treaties and few agreements. Hostility was abundant, particularly in the



days of McCarthyism when the media and politicians alike accused the Soviets of multiple misdeeds. Still, mid-'50s surveys found American public opinion less antagonistic to the USSR than our policy makers were, prompting more than one strategist to express concern. Brigadier General Frank Howley, military governor of Berlin, later Vice Chancellor of New York University, found Soviet peace moves especially damaging, for they gave a wrong impression to Americans. He stressed "the grave dangers implicit in any policy of coexistence."<sup>62</sup> In 1955-56, the USSR cut back its troop strength by nearly two million.

Indeed, key spokesmen often voiced aggressive intentions by promoting a policeman's role for our government through interventions in Guatemala, Iran and Vietnam and a war in Korea. Then, as now under Reagan, "Captive Nations" week ceremonies expressed the true attitude of administration officials toward Eastern European states with political systems different from that of the U.S.

But hardline anti-Soviet views weakened somewhat as the 1950s unfolded. Soviet and U.S. leaders began a regular exchange of opinions on the arms race. A series of letters between U.S. and Soviet leaders in the mid-'50s preceded a summit meeting in 1955 that strengthened the movement toward discussion and negotiation. Nonetheless, the two sides remained at odds and reached little agreement. Soviet troop reductions were unilateral, intending to lighten tensions, but President Dwight D. Eisenhower responded with charges that the USSR was violating international agreements by preventing the reunification of Germany. However, the latest such understanding (1955) had set no timetable for "settlement of the German question" and the holding of all-German

free elections "in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security": in fact "the interests of European security" suggested that recognition be given to the development of two completely different social systems on German soil, making reunification at that time somewhat problematic. In the spirit of older allegations of Soviet dishonesty, Eisenhower confessed bewilderment "as to how we can work together constructively if agreements which are negotiated at the highest level after the most thorough exploration do not seem dependable."<sup>63</sup>

But the continued lack of acceptance of the USSR as an equal remained the greater barrier to arms control. That U.S. official recognition of coexistence remained grudging was clear from the key Eisenhower treaty overture of the mid '50s: the "Open Skies" proposal. Amid new debates over disarmament timetables and guarantees, "Open Skies" called for the U.S. and USSR to exchange blueprints of "military establishments" (listing strength, structure, location of personnel and armed forces, as well as plants and installation) and to permit each other "unrestricted, but monitored, aerial reconnaissance by visual photographic and electronic means . . ."

"Open Skies" left actual arms cuts to rather nebulous latter stages, in contrast to the Soviet initiative of May 10, 1955, which itemized the steps from troop reductions to a phased arms ban to permanent inspection of nuclear facilities. During the 1950s, the Eisenhower administration insisted that agreement on inspection must precede arms cuts, that the latter could not even be considered until the former was resolved. Observer J. P. Morray termed the Eisenhower scheme "controls without disarmament."

Later in the 1950s, the two sides would move some-

what closer in their views on inspection and aerial photography, with the Soviets conceding photographic activity within certain border areas despite their fears that the Eisenhower administration had ulterior motives. Clear differences prevailed, however, in willingness to take actual steps to reduce tensions. The USSR made unilateral troop cuts in 1955, 1956, and 1958 and froze nuclear testing, also unilaterally, in 1958.<sup>64</sup>

Agreement seemed far off. Comprehensive Soviet suggestions for a multifold disarmament treaty in 1959 (including a three-stage program of disbanding all armed forces, destroying all weapons, ending all military training, dissolving all defense and war ministries, and abolishing all military budgets) evoked a familiar refrain among commentators. The *New York Herald Tribune* termed it a "gambit" and "impractical," condemning its "crudeness." The *New York Times* found its themes "time-worn," its purposes solely that of "propaganda," and noted that the all-important priority of "inspection" had not been broached. But, although such authorities as Senator Hubert Humphrey, Senator Mike Mansfield, and the *New York Post* urged Eisenhower to carefully consider and not immediately turn down the Soviet proposal, nothing came of it. The fact remains that no arms treaty was signed by the USA and the USSR for nearly twenty years after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.<sup>65</sup>

### The First Treaty Breakthroughs

The 1960s witnessed important breakthroughs in treaties. Not coincidentally, the period is the first broad subject of criticism in the October, 1984, report of Reagan's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and

Disarmament. The fact that Reagan is the only president (Democrat or Republican) in the past twenty-five years *not* to sign an arms treaty with the USSR is underlined by the very intensity with which his administration condemns all previous treaties with the Soviets and by the composition of his current negotiating team. At the heart of the condemnation lies the assumption of Soviet "violations."

Amid contrary trends, the 1960s represented a certain triumph of realism. The talks, summits, and exchanges of the late '50s, early '60s culminated in several historic agreements. Tendencies toward resolution of disputes through war, however, remained considerable: one recalls the escalating intervention in Vietnam, the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba, the mounting CIA activity in the Congo, Laos, and Angola, not to mention President Kennedy's stated approval of "first-strike" strategy in 1962. (*New York Times*, April 1, 1962).

With the continued expansion of U.S. peace sentiment, realists with their ears to the ground entered into the struggle among policy-makers. Their recognition that the U.S. could not act indiscriminately as the world's policeman seemed to prevail. The Cuban Missile crisis in 1962 had ended without a catastrophic nuclear war and with the anti-Castro designs of Cold Warriors frustrated. The USSR's agreement to remove its missiles if the U.S. pledged not to invade the island constituted one of the very first post-World War II U.S.-Soviet accords. "Violation" of this agreement by the USSR is one of the first complaints cited by Reagan's General Advisory Committee. The USSR is charged with having sent offensive missiles to Cuba several times since the 1962 accord.

But long-time State Department Cuba expert and



diplomat, Wayne S. Smith, found recently that these charges are rather flimsy: Soviet missile submarines have *not* visited Cuban ports; the 1962 accord did *not* prohibit Soviet troops in Cuba, the Carter administration in 1978 did *not* find the addition of MIG-23's to be in violation of the agreement (because they cannot carry nuclear weapons). What lay behind the Reagan administration charges? Smith suspected that Soviet "violations" were being alleged to justify our abrogation of the 1962 understanding, smoothing the way for "an American invasion of Cuba."<sup>66</sup>

After the USSR's 1958 unilateral testing freeze, the USA had followed suit. But Eisenhower announced in December 1959 that we would no longer be bound by the moratorium despite a U.N. General Assembly vote urging observance. Consequently, Soviet tests had resumed.<sup>67</sup> But an exchange of communications, a summit in Vienna, and an approximation of positions led the countries closer to a test-ban treaty in 1962.

The Cuban missile crisis led to the establishment of a U.S.-Soviet hotline. In August 1963, a test-ban treaty was signed by the USA, USSR and Great Britain. It banned nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water and was of "unlimited duration."

This became known as the Moscow Test-Ban Treaty, a most significant agreement and the first arms treaty since the advent of nuclear weapons. As tensions declined, President Kennedy had made an important appraisal (five months before he was assassinated): "Let us examine our attitude toward peace itself. Too many of us think it is impossible. But that is a dangerous, defeatist belief. It leads to the conclusion that war is inevitable. . . ." Nuclear war, said Kennedy, could not be realistically promoted by anybody. It could not be

limited: "All we have built, all we have worked for, would be destroyed in the first twenty-four hours." The U.S. and Soviet peoples had a "mutual abhorrence of war," and thus had basic "common interests." He declared, "Let us re-examine our attitude toward the cold war, remembering that we are not engaged in a debate, seeking to pile up debating points. . . . We must deal with the world as it is, and not as it might have been had the history of the last eighteen years been different."<sup>68</sup>

### Transition to Detente

Realism did not come suddenly upon the American "shapers" of detente—like Richard Nixon. A growing peace movement that brought together grassroots efforts of people from all races and beliefs played an important role in pressuring for normalizing relations with the USSR and with the rest of the world. That U.S. policies toward the USSR began assuming a certain new sobriety testified also to a deepening official appreciation of the world "as it is." Even so, conflicting trends became evident.

Early U.S. policies of "linkage," insisting that the Soviets prove dedication to world peace by halting assistance to the Vietnamese, accompanied the very difficult arms negotiations of the late '60s, early '70s. "Linkage" always expressed wishful thinking among U.S. policymakers, however. The Soviets and the Vietnamese both felt that arms limitation would check the nuclear intimidation so basic to the Southeast Asian strategies of the Johnson-Nixon years. Nor were the Vietnamese the only victims of aggression to support arms treaties and detente.

The lessening of international tensions required continuous pressure and effort. Panic especially gripped the Pentagon during these years as it became clear that the USSR had achieved a rough equality in nuclear strength with the United States—"parity." In official circles, "parity" quickly became Soviet "superiority." Adherent opponents of detente spoke out forcefully for a U.S. military buildup, seemingly willing to block any arms negotiations. Louisiana's conservative Senator Allan A. Ellender (in the early '60s) bore witness to the future debate:

I must conclude that there are in the State Department and in other agencies of our government groups which like to keep the pot boiling all the time, perhaps to retain their own jobs. That is why . . . we are having a great deal of trouble with the Russians.

Such observations found cogent expression in the contemporary column of James Wechsler: "Too many [officials] are committed to the proposition that there can be no break-through in the U.S.-Soviet deadlock"; and later reflection in the 1971 budget statement of Missouri's Senator Symington on the alleged Soviet "superiority":

One cannot fail to remember several comparable spring announcements of previous years; in the early 1950s those thousands of new long-range bombers the Soviets were going to build—but never built; in the late 1950s those hundreds upon hundreds of long-range missiles the Soviets were going to build—but never built.<sup>69</sup>

The suggestion that the U.S. violated the 1954 and 1962 Geneva accords on Southeast Asia has been made in a great body of documented research falling outside the scope of the present study; but Soviet Premier Alexei

Kosygin's 1970 exclamation (*Washington Post*, May 5) inspires reflection: "What is the value of international agreements to which the United States is or intends to be a party, if it so unceremoniously violates its obligations?"

In light of U.S.-Soviet treaties since 1972, the "first-strike" and "limited" nuclear war pronouncements by the Reagan administration (complete with a plan for domestic postal service *after* such a war, and an official study on how to survive a nuclear bombing)<sup>70</sup> are particularly disconcerting. But such policies cannot erase the overwhelming constituency that opposes them, that demands a return to detente and disarmament.

Reagan and his supporters in Congress have responded that the USSR has "violated" the important treaties of the 1970s. An examination of the Soviet record in such primary treaty areas as the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties, Biological and Chemical weapons limitation, as well as the Anti-Ballistic Missile agreement—particularly in view of President Reagan's "Star Wars" plan—is in order. U.S.-Soviet cooperation in other areas, too, shows the kinds of agreements possible. Considering that Reagan's assumptions about the USSR serve to excuse the breakdown in relations, one may see that past administrations reached wide-ranging understandings with that very same Soviet Union.



## THE SOVIET UNION AND SALT I, SALT II

The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT) represent the culmination of years of negotiation and constitute a benchmark, the upward curve of a process that put U.S.-Soviet relations on a new basis. Agreements banning the use of outer space and the moon for military purposes (1967), banning the transfer of nuclear weapons and technology to non-nuclear states (1968), and banning the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed (1972), helped pave the way for SALT.<sup>71</sup>

President Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev signed SALT I in 1972. The Treaty embraced two key agreements: the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Interim Agreement limiting strategic offensive arms. Fundamental to SALT I was the adoption of the "Basic Principles and Relations" between the two countries.

The ABM treaty bound the signatories to limit defensive missile systems, interceptor missiles, launchers (for the latter) and radars. Prohibited from generally deploying such systems to defend their respective territo-

ries, the two sides promised to consign ABM systems to the environs of the national capital, with a limit of 100 interceptor missiles and 100 launchers; radars were to be restricted to six sites. Another ABM system was allowed, also in a limited area, with ceilings on missile launchers and radars. A 1974 ABM Protocol reduced the number of ABM deployment areas from two to one.

"Each Party," read Article V, "undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based."

The sides answered the old "verification" controversy by permitting monitoring by "national technical means," including satellites, "consistent with generally recognized principles of international law," and established a "Standing Consultative Commission" to regularly discuss and resolve ambiguities, grievances, and charges. That Commission also assumed similar responsibilities in guaranteeing the other SALT agreements.<sup>72</sup>

The Interim Agreement (SALT I) limited construction and deployment of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's); it also curtailed the conversion of pre-1964 and "light" ICBM's into missiles of the more potent type. The Agreement got down to numerical specifics. Though each side accepted a different ceiling, both recognized that rough equality existed, though the countries had different numbers, types, and capabilities of weapons to begin with. Thus, the Soviet Union has more land-based (ICBM's) than the United States, while the USA far eclipses the USSR in submarine- and bomber-based weapons. Long and complex negotiations confirmed that rough parity prevailed, while reducing the ceilings and moving toward disarmament. A Brookings

Institution study in 1972 showed that SALT I preserved parity.<sup>73</sup>

In the "Basic Principles" governing U.S.-Soviet relations, the two countries affirmed the equality of the states and the coexistence of their social systems: "In the nuclear age there is no alternative to . . . peaceful coexistence. . . . Differences in ideology and in the social systems . . . are not obstacles to bilateral development of normal relations based on the principles of sovereignty, equality, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual advantage." The sides agreed to expand trade, scientific, and cultural contacts.<sup>74</sup>

Thus were the norms of contemporary international conduct encoded, overriding the suspicions and hostilities dating back to 1945, if not to 1917. Soon another declaration supplemented 1972's "Basic Principles." An "Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War," signed by Nixon and Brezhnev in June 1973, recognized that "nuclear war would have devastating consequences for mankind," and obligated the countries to refrain from force or threats against each other and to prevent "a dangerous exacerbation of their relations, as to avoid military confrontation . . . and the outbreak of nuclear war between them . . ."<sup>75</sup>

Critics of the Treaty emerged both within as well as outside the Nixon administration. The Defense Department revived consideration of "limited" nuclear war in 1974; (also in 1977, under Carter, and in 1981, under Reagan).<sup>76</sup>

The military-industrial complex mounted an assault on "loopholes" (in SALT I) that allegedly gave the advantage to the USSR. The foremost assailant was the late Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wash), often called "the Senator from Boeing." Assurances by U.S. intelligence

that Soviet compliance could be easily monitored under the treaty did not satisfy Jackson. He rejected the treaty's allowance of different ceilings for the weapons of the two powers, denied that parity existed and insisted that the Soviet side had manipulated the pact in its favor.

Not more than six weeks after the initialing of the pact, (as reported in the *Washington Post*) the Soviet Union, in conformity with treaty bans, moved to halt tests of certain missiles. The Standing Consultative Commission began functioning in December, 1972, handling disputes and questions in twice-yearly sessions.<sup>77</sup>

The attacks on SALT I increased. Again, critics cited Soviet superiority in land-based ICBM's, claiming that the treaty sanctioned imbalance. Other charges contended that the USSR was jamming U.S. monitoring equipment, concealing missile silos from overhead satellite surveillance and developing new radars in excess of the ABM treaty limit. On the other hand, the Soviet Union charged in 1974 that the USA was camouflaging missile silos in violation of the treaty. Former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger alleged that the USSR was "exploiting" SALT I's "gray areas."<sup>78</sup>

In a major address in early 1976, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger attested to the Ford administration's unflagging opposition to "Communist advances," and asked how anyone could think it "would ignore Soviet violations of a formal agreement." In fact, "this Administration will not tolerate violations," and would "continue to monitor Soviet compliance meticulously." All monitoring measures, he went on, proved that the charges of Soviet violations were false: "None of this is accurate." SALT had indeed *limited* the arms race; the Soviets *had* dismantled weapons to meet the treaty ceilings. A "strategic equilibrium" at "lower levels of forces" was evolving



as a result. The Standing Consultative Commission had discussed and resolved disputes and ambiguities; its recommendations were being checked, "not by some neutral policing mechanism but by each sides' own intelligence systems."<sup>79</sup>

An example of the Standing Commission's work was provided later in 1976, after a quiet U.S. protest that the Soviet Union had not dismantled the number of long-range ICBM's required to meet the SALT I ceilings. Admitting the infraction, the Soviets contended that dismantlement took a long time and said the delay was not deliberate. "American officials," reported *The New York Times*, "were pleased that the Soviet Union had acknowledged the technical violation on its own." The violation was termed "minor" and the Standing Commission gave the Soviets four more months to complete dismantling. Shortly thereafter, U.S. intelligence verified that the Soviet Union had fully complied.<sup>80</sup>

Reagan's General Advisory Committee renewed the old allegations in its October, 1984, report, charging the Soviets with having exceeded ICBM limits, concealed missile silos from verification, deployed mobile ABM radar (in violation of the ABM agreement), and exceeded the limit of ICBM launchers. The Committee pronounced the latter violation "probably not inadvertent, but rather . . . part of a deliberate Soviet effort to challenge U.S. arms control verification capabilities."<sup>81</sup>

Though Henry Kissinger's earlier answer to such charges can hold its own, other rebuttals have appeared that suggest even more forcefully that Soviet "violations" of SALT I are contrived. After an exhaustive investigation, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee declared in 1978 that it had "never found reason to accuse the Soviet Union of violating the provisions of SALT

I. . . . The record simply does not support any argument that the Soviet Union has acted in bad faith with regard to the SALT Treaty and Agreement."<sup>82</sup>

A former U.S. representative on the Standing Consultative Commission testified in 1979: "I do not believe that the Soviets would enter into any agreement which required them to cheat in order to attain their military objectives, or on which they planned to cheat."<sup>83</sup>

The charges, stated Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.) in 1983, rested heavily on "highly dubious speculation and hypothetical thought." No intelligence information had found "Soviet violation of the SALT agreements." In fact, even the Defense Department confirmed Soviet dismantlement of submarines to keep within SALT I limits.<sup>84</sup>

Perhaps the reverse is true. Maybe the United States has violated SALT I. A UPI report dated September 25, 1979, includes admissions by government officials of continued U.S. concealment of missile silos from Soviet surveillance.<sup>85</sup> But that is a subject for another study.

Before turning to the increasingly important ABM component of the SALT agreements, a review of SALT II and Soviet "violations" will be useful. Many of the defenders of SALT I had cited figures showing the overall military balance between the USA and USSR. As negotiations resumed during the '70s on a new SALT treaty, however, SALT's antagonists concentrated their fire on the "superiority" accorded the Soviet Union by SALT I. They proposed "getting tough," closing "loopholes," conducting a military buildup, or abandoning SALT altogether. Again, Henry Jackson was prominent among them. As SALT II negotiations developed, SALT I fell victim to unprecedented attacks.

Soviet "violations" charges received stern rebuke

from leading authorities and negotiators. Former Arms Control Agency director William C. Foster, who served from 1961 to 1969, accused the U.S. government of delaying a new treaty. Along with Gerard Smith (Nixon's top SALT I negotiator) and others, Foster denied Soviet infractions and charged the anti-SALT crowd with "doing irreparable damage . . . to the opportunities for future control on weapons of all kinds."<sup>86</sup>

The Carter administration's "hang tough" stance emerged during Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's visit to Moscow in the Spring of 1977. He presented SALT II proposals that, in the words of former National Security Council official Jan M. Lodal, "would bring the Soviet strategic program nearly to a halt, yet leave the United States program almost untouched." Carter had to realize, continued Lodal, that the USA must be "willing to consider tough limits on its own systems as well as limits on Soviet systems."<sup>87</sup>

Despite popular support for the treaty, a crescendo of "authoritative" criticism greeted the finalization of SALT II in 1978 and 1979. Again, much heat focused on Soviet "violations" of SALT I. Concentrating almost exclusively on the perils of SALT II, the Committee on the Present Danger came forward with fresh warnings of Soviet "superiority," courtesy of SALT I. The Committee feared an official U.S. willingness to tolerate Soviet infractions in order to preserve an illusory "detente." The Soviet Union, contended the Committee, viewed treaties as "scraps of paper."

The "Coalition for Peace Through Strength" took the same position. It termed SALT II an "act of phased surrender." Spearheaded by ultra-conservatives in the

military and in Congress, the Coalition predicted that SALT II would give the USSR a 2-to-1 advantage in strategic offensive weapons; a 6-to-1 advantage in missile megatonnage and accuracy; and a 47-to-1 advantage in strategic defensive weapons. Besides, added the anti-SALT *U.S. News and World Report*, the new treaty could not be verified, compliance could not be monitored; Soviet cheating would proceed unhampered.<sup>88</sup>

What did SALT II call for? Signed by Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev in 1979, as yet unratified by the U.S. Senate, SALT II limited strategic offensive arms. It set ceilings on intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers; heavy bombers with long-range cruise missiles; and missiles equipped with several warheads, each capable of destroying a different place. These weapons are more verbosely called multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles or MIRVs and MIRV launchers. SALT II also limited new ICBM launchers of both the mobile and the "fixed" type and the number of warheads on existing and future types of ICBM's. It banned the Soviet ICBM known as SS-16.

The treaty established the dates by which missiles and launchers in excess of the ceilings would be dismantled or destroyed. For this latter purpose, one year was allotted: from January 1 to December 31, 1981. "National technical means of verification,"—particularly satellite surveillance—would assure compliance. The Standing Commission created by SALT I would meet regularly to consider all issues of compliance. Each party pledged "not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty."

A concluding statement obligated the two sides to continue negotiations for limiting and reducing strategic arms on a basis of equality and equal security." All steps



would be pursued to strengthen peace and security "and to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war."<sup>89</sup>

Echoing the anti-SALT constituencies of the '70s, Reagan's General Advisory Committee in 1984 noted the following Soviet "violations": the "probable existence" of the SS-16 ICBM in defiance of the ban; the "concealment" of that missile, in spite of the requirements of verification; the "probable" testing of an additional ICBM (SS-X-25) beyond the treaty ceiling of only one new type; and the concealment of the latter from approved surveillance. The Committee was uncertain about this new missile, complaining that "extensive encryption . . . impedes U.S. understanding of the missile." Deprived of "understanding," the Committee nevertheless went on to suggest that the missile "very likely fits the treaty definition of a new ICBM (despite Soviet insistence that the SS-X-25 is a *legal* modification of the SS-13, an ICBM of the mid-1960s.)"<sup>90</sup>

The facts indicate Soviet compliance with SALT II. Inability to verify what the Soviets are "really" doing has itself been blown out of proportion. So ample and diverse are U.S. technical means of detection—radar and satellite—that speculation about what the USSR is "up to" behind the "cover" of SALT II is illogical. The Soviets could indeed cheat to the limited extent that our surveillance could not pick up; but no military advantage, nor disruption of present balance, could accrue to such minute violations, were they to occur. Further, observed Congressman Les Aspin (D-Wisc.), the Soviet leaders would be quite unlikely to risk the political repercussions of more flagrant and public violations of a treaty and a process to which they attribute such significance.

Allegations of Soviet misuse of SALT II, commented James Wicghart in the *New York Daily News*,

are "bogus and misleading," geared toward halting "any arms agreement with the Soviets at all, however fair and verifiable it might be."<sup>91</sup>

Authoritative testimony supports the joint 1980 assertion by the Defense Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency that the Soviet "compliance performance" under SALT II and a dozen other treaties "has been good."<sup>92</sup>

Senator Joseph Biden points out that if the USSR's new ICBM possesses the same number of stages and type of propellant of each stage as the single allowable new ICBM, then it is not a violation of SALT II: the two weapons are the same type. Citing the latest conclusions of U.S. intelligence, Biden finds that the Soviets are *under* the ceiling for MIRV missile launchers and bombers with long-range cruise missiles, and *below* the treaty limits on MIRV, ICBM's and SLBM's.

Allegations that the Soviets have given some ICBM's a "rapid reload capacity," in violation of SALT II, are refuted by the Defense Department's own paper, *Soviet Military Power* (which otherwise promotes the notion of a Soviet "threat"): "The Soviets probably cannot refurbish and reload silo launchers in a period less than a few days."<sup>93</sup>

Of particular interest has been the Reagan administration's persistent neglect of SALT's Standing Consultative Commission as an instrument of complaint, consultation, and resolution. William E. Jackson (head of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control under President Carter) observes: "Not only does the United States not ask compliance questions in the Standing Consultative Commission, it refuses to use that body to implement certain provisions of SALT II." In fact,

though the Reagan administration has pledged to uphold SALT II notwithstanding the Senate's failure to ratify, it has pressured for a figurative, not a literal interpretation of that promise. In response to a 1982 House of Representatives resolution that the U.S. "shall approve" SALT II if verification is assured, the administration offered the wording "should approve," because, wrote Jackson, it "does not want to be legally bound by the provisions of SALT II."<sup>94</sup>

If Soviet violations were as common and massive as charged, then the authoritative gauges of nuclear capability would certainly find the Soviets "ahead" of—in fact, "superior" to the United States.<sup>95</sup> But that is not the case. A battery of sources shows that overall parity prevails. As for U.S. compliance, even the testimony of such Senators as Daniel Moynihan, Dale Bumpers and Alan Cranston suggests that the MX missile clearly violates SALT II; and other infractions have been noted.

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown stated in 1980, "... We are second to none."<sup>96</sup> Secretary of State Edmund Muskie spoke then of "an overall balance" in U.S.-Soviet strength,<sup>97</sup> while former Pentagon official Adam Yarmolinsky warned of a "dangerous inflation" of Soviet ability: whatever numerical edge possessed by the Soviets in troops and weapons was balanced by "our qualitative superiority."<sup>98</sup>

Alexander Haig, Reagan's first Secretary of State, testified in 1981 that U.S. forces are strategically "more sophisticated and reliable and more technologically sound."<sup>99</sup> Though perceiving a Soviet "threat" in 1982, former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger decried Reagan's contention of U.S. "inferiority" as "unwise". "Indeed, in regard to strategic forces particularly, the issue is much too ambiguous at any rate."<sup>100</sup> The two

sides, commented SALT negotiator Gerard Smith in 1982, are "in a position of parity,"<sup>101</sup> or, in the terms of the Union of Concerned Scientists, "rough equality."<sup>102</sup>

Testimony by former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara: "I, myself, believe they've [the Soviets] gotten weaker";<sup>103</sup> and Casper Weinberger: "We have an immense edge in technology"<sup>104</sup> throw today's confirmation of parity into even bolder relief. "The balance is even," wrote defense analyst Gordon Adams in 1984.<sup>105</sup>

After sifting evidence from the CIA, NATO, Defense Department, and the International Institute of Strategic Studies, the Center for Defense Information shows the U.S. ahead in total nuclear weapons, strategic weapons, weapons aimed at the opponent, nuclear weapons tests, strategic bombers, nuclear weapons on such bombers, and nuclear weapons on submarines; the Soviets lead in ICBM's, nuclear warheads on ICBM's, and strategic submarines.<sup>106</sup>

Thus, observes Herbert Scoville, former Deputy Director of the CIA in charge of Research, Science and Technology, an immediate nuclear freeze would hardly discriminate against the United States.<sup>107</sup> Indeed, Robert McNamara makes clear, "there is no military requirement for NATO to deploy the Pershing II's and cruise missiles in order to maintain a stable deterrent."<sup>108</sup> But these missiles *are* being deployed, thus defying parity, upsetting the balance, and violating SALT II's injunction to respect "equality and equal security."<sup>109</sup>

### Violations in Fantasia

Current charges of Soviet cheating on the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty of 1972 merit special attention, for



they serve to justify the most dangerous round of the arms race yet imagined, the so-called "Star Wars" program envisioned by Reagan. That plan would take nuclear weaponry into another zone entirely.

Anti-ballistic missiles, as the name suggests, are weapons of defense. But they have an offensive potential, for the country with superior ABM defenses could fire its offensive ICBM's at the enemy—in a first strike—in the confidence that it could shoot down the opponent's responding ICBM's (if any) with its own ABM's. Thus, the unlimited development of ABM's promotes the potential of offensive first-strike.

The 1972 treaty was therefore a most important check on the arms race. It will be recalled that the treaty (and its 1974 Protocol) limited each side to one ABM deployment area on its territory; banned ABM systems that were sea-based, *space*-based, air-based, or *mobile* land-based; banned ABM's with multiple warheads (each of which could hit a different target); and imposed a ceiling on the number of radars each side could have within its single ABM deployment site.

In the event of a nuclear attack, the effectiveness of ABM's would owe much to the guiding capabilities of satellites and radars. But suppose ABM defenses could knock out the other side's satellites? Surely, this would cripple the opponent. How might such ability best be achieved? By deploying ABM weapons in space, perhaps a thousand miles above the earth. This deployment would supposedly both neutralize the others' satellites and facilitate one's ability to quickly knock out incoming offensive missiles. Then, if it worked, ABM systems would no longer need to be based on earth. The possible launching of offensive missiles and their interception from above—by ABM's could all take place in outer space.

Indeed, asked President Reagan on March 23, 1983, "Wouldn't it be better to save lives than to avenge them? . . . What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?"

Soviet "violations" of the ABM treaty constitute a central excuse for the dangerous fantasies in the White House.

Here are the charges: that the Soviet Union has broken the treaty by developing anti-satellite weapons (ASAT's), including laser and particle-beam (a stream of atoms or even smaller particles accelerated to nearly the speed of light) devices to be deployed in space; that the Soviets have accelerated research on ABM's in order to soon "break out" of treaty strictures; that they have given surface-to-air missiles (intended solely to shoot down planes) an *anti-missile* capability (the latter two charges, reported the *Washington Post*, stem from "suspicion in the Pentagon and elsewhere" of apparent Soviet actions); that they have deployed a *mobile* radar system; again, despite the treaty.

Reagan's General Advisory Committee developed the accusations in its October 1984 report, charging also that the Soviets have broken the treaty clause confining "early warning radar" to the periphery of one's own country; instead, they have constructed this type of radar in the interior of Siberia.<sup>110</sup>

But respected scientists and authorities have seriously questioned whether the Soviets have violated the treaty. Leslie Gelb reported in the *New York Times* (March 15, 1985) that British and American intelligence experts are "saying that Moscow's explanation for the radar . . .

cannot be ruled out. The Russians have said that the radar is for space tracking and is allowable under the treaty." On the treaty's fifth anniversary, the Standing Consultative Commission affirmed that the 1972 accord was operating effectively: consultations and discussion had resolved all questions. In 1980, the USSR dismantled half its anti-ballistic missiles based around Moscow. In a study of U.S.-Soviet agreements, the Federation of American Scientists in 1984 declared the USSR's new Siberian radar incapable of "the ABM battle management function;" the USSR has maintained that the radar is solely a "space-tracking," non-military, apparatus. Though the scientists perceived a potential ABM capability in that radar (clarification of which ought to occur in "serious, private negotiations"), they asserted: "There is much less than meets the eye in the administration's charges," and criticized administration efforts to raise doubts "about the reliability of the USSR as a negotiating partner."<sup>111</sup>

No apparent Soviet violation of the treaty detected thus far, insists leading ABM negotiator Gerard Smith, "suggests a serious threat" to our security. The charges, writes Smith, involve "possible technical breaches" (i.e., "the location and capability of a new radar") and nothing more, certainly giving no grounds for either "treaty termination" or Reagan's leap into outer space. Arms analysts Herbert Scoville and Benjamin Austin reach the same conclusion, showing also that the anti-satellite system developed by the Soviets is "primitive" (capable of knocking out only the lowest-orbiting U.S. satellites) and "so slow and inflexible . . . that a strike against all endangered U.S. satellites would easily allow detection and retaliation by other means." They too warn against U.S. abrogation of the treaty on the assumption of Soviet "vi-

olations," calling instead for a comprehensive ban on weapons in outer space.<sup>112</sup>

The Soviet leaders, too, have endorsed such a ban. In August 1983, Yuri Andropov announced a Soviet commitment "not to be the first to put into outer space any type of anti-satellite weapons," proposing that Reagan respond in kind. Konstantin Chernenko also called several times for American-Soviet talks on a treaty totally prohibiting those weapons.<sup>113</sup>

Although the very strong possibility of U.S. desertion of ABM obligations does not come within the purview of this study, it has been widely mentioned elsewhere. U.S. scientists have detected substantial ABM violations in Pentagon space research since the late 1970s. Defense Department officials spoke openly in 1981 of expanding ABM's but couching their language, according to one spokesman, "in arms control terms." Senator Larry Pressler warned in 1982 of Pentagon space-based ABM systems that would break the ABM treaty.<sup>114</sup>

Regan's science advisor, George Keyworth, contends that the administration would resist an anti-space weapons treaty "for a couple of years—or more—in order to get our programs going full blast." (Indeed, arms consultants have been bidding for space-weapons research for quite some time: there is a lot of money to be made.) Besides, wrote Reagan's Under Secretary of Defense Fred Iklé, Soviet "violations" have made treaties worthless anyway, and the USA therefore is not obliged to uphold them: "What is so valuable about this so-called 'arms control process' that must be preserved by making the ABM treaty forever untouchable?"<sup>115</sup>

The Reagan administration, has resisted further negotiations on other treaties, for the very same reason. It has opposed talks on a comprehensive test-ban agreement



(there have been partial test bans but no single ban covers all environments) on the grounds that the Soviets have broken such preliminary accords as the 1974 Threshold Ban treaty (banning tests in excess of 150 kilotons (150,000 tons of TNT) and the 1976 Underground Nuclear Explosions treaty (banning explosions over 150 kilotons).

Contradicting administration assertions, U.S. and British intelligence reports and European and American geophysicists have shown that Soviet tests are well under the ceilings. Scientist Lynn Sykes found "no substance to the contention that the Soviet Union has been repeatedly cheating on the threshold test ban." The administration's "discovery" of Soviet breaches, according to an article in the October, 1982 *Scientific American*, could only have resulted from "a miscalibration of one of the curves that relates measured seismic magnitude to explosive yield."<sup>116</sup> What accounts for this faulty research?

## BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS

The USSR is bound by two key treaties banning biological, chemical, and bacteriological warfare: the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972. Charges of Soviet "violations" have surfaced with a vengeance in connection with two controversial "hotspots": Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. Accusations date from 1980 and appear again in the 1984 study by Reagan's General Advisory Committee. Of all assumptions of Soviet "cheating," this has evoked the widest debate in the United States.<sup>117</sup>

The Reagan administration holds that Soviet troops in Afghanistan and Soviet-supplied Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea have employed chemical weaponry and gases banned by international law. The administration has produced blood, urine, vegetation, and water samples to support the allegations. Secretary of State George Schultz reported much evidence of chemical agents and toxins in Afghanistan, Laos, and Kampuchea, citing as well the testimony of victims and doctors, including physicians

who had treated the U.S.-backed forces who opposed the Afghan and Kampuchean governments. A defecting Soviet infantryman in Afghanistan in 1982 surfaced as an expert on the subject, and "told all" to a British reporter on location with the "resistance fighters": his accounts also went into Schultz' report. The Secretary of State protested: "The world cannot be silent in the face of such human suffering and such cynical disregard for international law and agreements."

U.S. representative Kenneth Adelman soon reiterated the accusation before the UN. "The facts are grim," he warned: "Let us not be misled by denials. . . . A treaty that when broken causes no outcry is without strength. The evidence is now in." The temptation to attribute the findings on samples to "nature," and not to Soviet laboratories, was strong; but one had to resist the "will to disbelieve."<sup>118</sup>

Unfortunately for Adelman and Schultz, many Americans could not resist, and among them were leading scientists. Questions first appeared in *Science* magazine in 1980 and have been mounting ever since. Researchers expressed substantial doubts about the reliability of the yellow-coated mycotoxin samples brought back from the two regions.

It was revealed that the State Department forbade all but its own analysts to study the evidence. Writing in *Science* (November 27, 1981), Nicholas Wade wondered about the pro-Reagan bias of certain of the providers of evidence (for instance the Pol Pot forces in Kampuchea).

It was found that mycotoxins develop naturally in Southeast Asia. But laboratory-produced substances of the type employed in chemical weapons would have produced a much higher concentration of mycotoxins than

were present in the State Department samples used in "proving" Soviet manufacture: the latter included a very small percentage of mycotoxins. Nicholas Wade suggested that the State Department "had gone public with a sketchily-documented case, as if the desire to bespatter the Russians had outweighed judgment to wait for a firmer case."<sup>119</sup>

Scientists were not the only witnesses undermining the accusations. A Defense Intelligence Agency official told a Congressional hearing on February 8, 1980, "There is no confirmation that they [the Soviets in Afghanistan] have used chemical weapons." When Rep. Robert Lagomarsino (R.-Cal.) asked about "rumors in the the papers" of Soviet chemical warfare, the CIA's Bruce C. Clarke responded: "I don't see anything wrong with letting that rumor run."<sup>120</sup>

But scientists did continue their probing challenge of administration allegations. A former U.S. Army chemical weapons researcher wondered openly whether the State Department charges "may not be evidence of Soviet duplicity but rather products of leading questions to defectors and imaginative refugees." A *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* article termed the allegations "at best premature and at worst demonstrably erroneous."<sup>121</sup>

After examining U.S.-provided samples of chemical weapons derived "yellow rain," a team of Australian Defense Department scientists revealed in 1983 that the yellow spots were "due to pollen grains." They were "not toxic," nor did they convey "information at all as to the veracity or otherwise of the reports of chemical attacks." As far as evidence of chemical weapons was concerned, the Australian defense analysts concluded, "these are fakes."<sup>122</sup>

Within the year, two American scientists concluded



on the basis of the evidence that "yellow rain" was in fact the excretion of wild honeybees, a discovery the State Department hotly disputed. Such scientific speculation, said a Department spokesman, only "serves to divert serious attention from the real issues of chemical warfare."

But the State Department reported in 1984 that evidence of Soviet chemical warfare was increasingly difficult to come by. The Reagan administration attributed "the trail of negative results" to a halt in Soviet use. But the *New York Times* related: "The Government has also quietly backed away from some of the preliminary laboratory evidence it once cited to demonstrate that yellow rain was being used as a weapon in Afghanistan." Indeed, in the view of researchers, U.S. evidence "falls far short of conclusive proof": "Not a single munition clearly associated with chemical warfare has ever been found." The journal *Chemical and Engineering News* termed government samples a "meager lot" whose significance was "questionable."<sup>123</sup>

The article "Yellow Rain" in the September, 1985 *Scientific American* (pp. 128-137) proves conclusively that the U.S. charges of yellow-rain chemical warfare are absurd. The "yellow rain" is a natural phenomenon, honeybee feces!

But the allegation of Soviet misconduct and "violations" has been the wedge for the Reagan administration's efforts to "permissibly" burst the bonds of arms limitation agreements, and to renew its production of chemical weapons. Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary Theodore Gold has emphasized the need for the U.S. to improve its chemical weapons "capability" by preparing for production. NATO Commander Bernard Rogers told a recent news conference the same thing. In November,

1984, the Army requested \$250 million in government funds for chemical and biological warfare research at a \$1.4 million "aerosol test lab" at the Dugway Proving Ground in Utah.

Yet U.S. accusations of Soviet non-compliance continued.<sup>24</sup> As a cover-up for illegal U.S. actions?

## SOVIET "DECEPTION" IN OTHER REALMS

Something of the diversity of U.S.-Soviet agreements may be gleaned from a brief survey of non-military areas, particularly trade. During the 1973 Nixon-Brezhnev summit, the two countries reached accord on a broad set of programs and began an era of collaboration that came to a close with the Carter administration's abrogation of, or failure to renew, the programs following the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan.<sup>125</sup>

Though the State Department today maintains that the "structure of scientific and technology cooperation" has been retained since Afghanistan, the majority of these accords have been held hostage to Reaganism, gutted like domestic social programs.<sup>126</sup>

There was, for example, an agreement for cooperation in housing construction. Exchanges on reliability, safety, quality and economy of construction were to have occurred. Construction methods "in areas of extreme climatic conditions, such as cold and arid regions," were designated for joint study. Conferences, meetings, sem-

inars, and research projects were scheduled. Heating, lighting, waste disposal, water supply and other utilities were to have been regularly discussed and studied, with a view toward improvement.<sup>127</sup>

The two sides drew up an accord on cooperation in energy research, pledging to exchange information and experience in the use of existing and alternative energy sources, including fossil fuels, oil, shale, coal, solar, geothermal and synthetic fuels. They planned scientific exchanges and joint research.<sup>128</sup> They reached accord on joint research on the human heart and heart disease. Regular exchanges, conferences, and workshops were to have been held. They agreed to promote "research on, and joint development and testing of devices, materials, instruments and control mechanisms which will provide cardiovascular support, including total heart replacement."<sup>129</sup>

The U.S. and USSR pledged to cooperate for the purpose of improving public transportation, together studying safety and efficiency in mass transit. Bridge and tunnel construction, airplane travel, and automobile safety were just a few of the subjects to be dealt with in conferences, study projects, and other programs.<sup>130</sup>

There were additional agreements: on combatting air pollution (1972); on general cooperation in health research (1972); on expansion of educational collaboration; on cultural contacts (including exchanges of "theatrical, musical, and choreographic ensembles, orchestras, other artistic and entertainment groups, and individual performers," as well as films, radio and TV programs, books and magazines). The cultural agreement of 1974-76, set new highs for understanding between Soviets and Americans.<sup>131</sup>

Guiding the prevailing minds in the Reagan admin-



istration, the renewed chill of the Cold War laid waste to cooperation. Those were useful programs; ordinary people stood to gain from such cooperation and would benefit from its revival.

Mention must be made of trade. Again, U.S. sanctions and unilateral curtailment of agreements have cast commercial relations in the shadows. During the peak of U.S.-Soviet trade, many hundreds of thousands of U.S. jobs were created and saved by Soviet observation of trade commitments with American companies. The auto workers', longshoremen's, and electrical workers' unions were among the many labor organizations that endorsed U.S.-Soviet trade; when trade ebbed, their members were among the many men and women who lost their jobs.<sup>132</sup>

The 1972 trade accord granted "most favored nation status" to the USSR: the lowest regular tariff rates. But the amendment to the accord put forth by Senator Henry Jackson made "most favored nation status" contingent upon elimination by the Soviet government of the fees Jews were alleged to be required to pay in order to emigrate. Jackson's legislation, of course, violated the Agreement's "Basic Principles" prohibition of interference in the internal affairs of either nation.<sup>133</sup>

Within narrowed and unfavorable confines, U.S.-Soviet trade still grew. The experience of American businessmen indicates that the Soviets were and are faithful to contracts. "The Russians haven't held back on their orders," reported Ingersoll Milling's (Rockford, Ill.) Edson Gaylord in 1973. Pepsico's Donald Kendell has declared, "the USSR is a good trading partner." The USSR has plenty to offer in trade, he contends, not the least of which are oil, natural gas, chrome, and platinum. Simon Chilewich of the Chilewich Corporation has traded with the USSR for over a quarter-century: "Not once in all

those years has the Soviet Union reneged on a contract." His Soviet counterparts have been "most satisfactory trading partners—in terms of negotiating in good faith and living up to their commitments in good faith."

Soviet technological "incompetence" ought not be exaggerated, wrote Kiser Research's John Kiser III in *Harvard Business Review* in 1982. Soviet "backwardness" is a myth: such American enterprises as the Washington D.C. Metro, Dupont, Bristol-Myers, and 3-M have used Soviet-made parts. Echoing Kiser's views, prominent Chicago mortgage banker Erwin Salk notes that the USSR has "the largest growing economy in the world," offering huge potential for trade; "the Soviet economy is not a weak economy and will not collapse." Experience shows that the USSR's "credit worthiness is excellent; external debt negligible; resources tremendous."<sup>134</sup>

Cold war hostility took priority over the potential for business and jobs. Unilateral abrogation of such deals as the sale of American wheat to the Soviet Union cast doubt upon U.S. contractual worthiness. Even before that, the Jackson amendment had weighed heavily against trade, leading Michael Forrestal of the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council to wonder in 1979 if "our reliability as a supplier" could be depended upon.

And indeed, businessmen and others have worried openly about actions that seriously impair "the reputation of the U.S. as a reliable trading partner," questioning not only the commercial wisdom of cutting trade in order to "punish" the Soviets, but further suggesting that such pressures and threats violate international law.<sup>135</sup>

## HELSINKI FINAL ACT

The improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations and of contacts between capitalist and socialist countries generally, gave impetus in the 1970s to a continental lessening of tensions which produced the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Leaders of thirty-five nations, including the United States and Canada, attended.

In the lexicon of present-day international concerns, "Helsinki" means much more than the capital of Finland. It represents that historic meeting. "Helsinki" also signifies the agreement the leaders signed: the "Final Act."

The Conference required years of preparation and debate. The preparations drew delegates from governments of both capitalist and socialist countries to hammer out a common understanding of peace.

The Conference took place thirty years after the establishment of the United Nations, and the spirit of the U.N. Charter reverberates in the Helsinki Final Act. In the era of nuclear threats previously unfathomed, the Final Act affirms the equality of all nations. It rescues

from Cold War obfuscation the sovereignty and independence of states and the necessity of peaceful coexistence of countries, regardless of social system.

The Final Act does not simply repeat the U.N. Charter. It recognizes that coexistence begins with disarmament and obligates the signatories to negotiate. It defines a spectrum of state-to-state and people-to-people exchanges that promote a living, vibrant, enlightened understanding between nations.

It is not coincidental that the Final Act reads at times like the U.S.-Soviet "Basic Principles" of 1972 or in so many dimensions like the U.S.-Soviet treaties on co-operation. The Final Act opens with a Declaration affirming the will of all parties ("irrespective of the political, economic or social systems") to respect "sovereign equality," non-use of force, "inviolability of frontiers," "territorial integrity of states," "non-intervention of internal affairs," "human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief," "equal rights and self-determination of peoples," and "cooperation among states."

The Final Act comprises three key sections.

In recommending "confidence-building measures," the agreement calls upon the governments to inform one another of major military maneuvers (over 25,000 troops) and stresses that "the political and military aspects of security" are "complementary." The parties recognize the underlying importance of disarmament.

The second part of the Final Act encourages a host of cooperative agreements in trade, industrial projects, science and technology, combatting pollution, improving transportation, and promotion of tourism.

The third section concerns "cooperation in humanitarian and other fields." It recommends a battery of



programs serving to strengthen "understanding among peoples" and "the spiritual enrichment of the human personality without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion." The programs promote reunification of families, youth exchanges, sports contacts, circulation of information in the media, exchanges producing awareness of the different cultures and educational exchanges.

On the highways and by-ways of Reaganism, Soviet "violations" of "Helsinki" are both legion and legendary. It has been suggested that in the Final Act's recognition of equality, sovereignty, and inviolability of frontiers, the Soviet Union achieved "formal recognition" of the post-war political contours of Eastern Europe. For that reason, it went along with Helsinki's humanitarian and human rights principles, never intending to fulfill them.<sup>136</sup>

Indeed, as sources insist, the Conference essentially guaranteed "the de facto national borders of Europe that had existed since World War II," resulting from the USSR's liberation of Eastern Europe from Nazi occupation.<sup>137</sup>

The key to charges of Soviet "violations" of Helsinki lies in the chronic difficulty some cold warriors have in digesting peaceful coexistence and international law. In upholding cooperation and non-interference, the Final Act would appear to discourage Western efforts to reverse socialism in Eastern Europe, a goal toward which the leaders of some states have striven for a good while. The Act's human rights provisions need not conflict with its disarmament, confidence-building, economic, and social recommendations. Yet, the bulk of accusations of Soviet noncompliance set the human rights segments apart from, against, and above the rest. The criticisms actually go much further than pointing out "violations of human

rights" in socialist countries. They challenge socialism as a system. To born-again cold warriors, Helsinki follow-up meetings offer regular opportunities to condemn Soviet society. This condemnation has become the only purpose of official U.S. interest in implementation of the Final Act.

Today, Reagan administration spokesmen continue to make their conception of "human rights" the global yardstick for judging others, a club for beating the rival social system.

Thus, a typical Reagan report on implementation of the Final Act said the administration was disappointed and made the following points: that "substantive commitments in the human rights area must accompany any agreement in the military security field"; that U.S. condemnation of human rights breaches was assuming increasing "frankness and detail," including "indicting the East in general"; that the U.S. was concerned for the welfare of Soviet Jews, Georgians, Armenians and "activist Christians"; that the "Soviet Government's intolerance for activity deemed incompatible with Communist Party control continued to be particularly evident"—despite formal guarantees in the Soviet constitution; that Soviet trade unions "are strictly subordinated to the Communist Party and serve as instruments of the government"; that no freedom of religion obtains in the USSR; that non-Russians suffer erosion of national rights; that Soviet authorities ban publication of views opposed "to ideological standards established by the government and Communist Party"; that despite apparent Polish progress in allowing "a pluralism in viewpoints" and trends toward "a true multiparty system. . . . direct criticism" of party and government was "still taboo."<sup>138</sup>

The trade, cultural, military and disarmament fea-

tures of Final Act compliance find little space in a typical Reaganite report, perhaps because they occupy so obscure a corner in President Reagan's policies. On confidence-building measures, the President relates that major military maneuvers of all countries had been publicized in advance (as required by the Final Act) with the exception of the USSR's September 1981 maneuvers. Here though, the report notes that the USSR did declare the size, purpose, time and area while failing only to mention the "designation" of maneuvers until the latter were already under way. The report mentions that Soviet maneuver violations in March of 1981 may actually *not* have occurred; this reversed a previous report's charge that they had. Despite the reversal, Reagan's General Advisory Committee repeated the uncorrected charge in its October 1984 report.<sup>139</sup>

If "substantive commitments in the human rights area" according to Reagan, must "accompany" progress in "the military security field," little room is left for cooperation and disarmament. One must recall that the Helsinki Final Act is a peace document that summarizes and projects the cooperative experiences of thirty-five countries and millions of people. It does not require that the two rival socio-economic systems fall in love. It does not deny leaders the right to disapprove goings-on in other countries. But the Final Act declares that human rights cannot be examined and applied separately from the basic principles of international law, of equality, sovereignty, and noninterference. It assumes that the solution of human rights problems in each country is mainly the province of the people of that country.

Clearly, there is an effort underfoot to make Soviet acknowledgment of compliance with Helsinki contingent upon changes in the nature of the USSR's social system.

Thus, the Soviet Union could not be adjudged loyal to international obligations until or unless it adopts a way of life conforming to the Western "values" as seen through Reagan's eyes. And because these involve much deeper issues, Helsinki could be brought to a dead end, for the Soviet Union will not change its system to comply with hostile "demands" that it do so. When "military security" is made dependent on Soviet conformity with Reagan's human rights conceptions (from which most Americans themselves have never benefited), what is left to negotiate?



## CONCLUSION

Central to the myth of the Soviet "threat" is the assumption of a fundamentally dishonest and deceptive socialist USSR. This assumption holds more than incidental value for that section of our society that feeds on the arms race, the military-industrial complex and its spokesmen in government. Of this constituency, the remark of a *New York Times* reviewer in 1973 retains validity today: "death has a lobby in Washington." The observation of writer Sidney Lens bears directly on the motivation of Cold War notions:

The military and their political and corporate allies are caught in a fatal trap. They raise the cry: "You can't trust the Russians" to justify ever larger expenditures for arms; the people and Congress respond by providing the necessary funds for the new weapons; the Soviets reply with counter-weapons of their own, whereupon the military demand new counter-counter weapons to offset the "Soviet advantage." And in order to get those weapons, they raise the cry: "You can't trust the Russians" all over again. It is a never-ending game.<sup>140</sup>

## CONCLUSION 97

The historical register challenges the allegation of Soviet disregard for treaties. The point is not that the Soviet Union is infallible, its record immaculate, but rather that the very lens through which U.S. policymakers have viewed the USSR has been ground and polished with assumptions that conflict with the factual record. In fact, the evidence shows that the Soviet Union has honored its treaty obligations.

The Reagan administration has not for a moment abandoned the mandate of the 1980 Republican platform (since bolstered by the entrenchment of the far right in that party's leadership), notwithstanding its disruption of arms negotiations:

We will build toward a sustained defense expenditure sufficient to close the gap with the Soviets, and ultimately reach the position of military superiority that the American people demand.<sup>141</sup>

As the administration, responding to pressure from U.S. and world public opinion, becomes apparently more attentive to and ready for possible development of the negotiations, key policymakers still endorse and prepare detailed accounts of Soviet "violations." This would appear to be a major channel for conveying anti-Sovietism to Americans.

Even as Reagan dons a peaceful expression, the resounding figures of Soviet "violations" filled the final columns of 1984 and into 1985. The State Department "found" seven key violations of arms agreements. The General Advisory Committee located seventeen, a White House report promised information on nineteen in February, 1985. This coincided with a Congressional vote on the MX missile, whose undermining of SALT II was

justified by Soviet "cheating." Pro-MX Republicans have called upon Reagan to abrogate SALT II.

Ironically, this wave of charges accompanies the revelation that the Soviet military budget has not risen in the past fourteen years: for a number of years, it even declined. To maintain balance with the West, a hike was scheduled in 1985.<sup>142</sup>

But the chief aim of the recent charges of Soviet "violations" is to vindicate an administration that has pushed our globe to the nuclear edge. The General Advisory Committee's report appears polished (though veteran SALT negotiator Gerard Smith denounced it as "sloppy" and inconclusive);<sup>143</sup> an intellectual, documented excuse for Reagan's resistance to a nuclear freeze and disarmament. Though the ever-increasing danger of nuclear war demands new dedication to arms talks and lessening of tensions, a Committee member writes "that Soviet misbehavior has cast doubt on the wisdom of persisting in arms control." If that "behavior" continues, the USA should "no longer abide by the restrictions of SALT II and the ABM (antiballistic missile) treaty." If U.S. officials do not pursue the charges of Soviet "violations," our country will suffer "loss of . . . credibility." The West seems "naively to equate ongoing arms talks with a diminished chance of war."

But what of the paucity of evidence of Soviet "violations"? The architects of U.S. military superiority have a solution:

. . . It is unrealistic to insist that accusations of cheating on arms control agreements must be held to the rigid standards of proof required at criminal trials. U.S. officials generally lack direct access to physical evidence of violations, and they cannot command Soviet officials to

appear as defendants or subpoena witnesses. Moreover, the standards of proof at criminal trials—proof beyond a considerable doubt—is designed to protect the comparatively weak individual defendant against the state. The Soviet Union hardly needs such consideration. In addition, a treaty is a compact between countries and hence should be subject to lower civil standards of proof. But what is most important to recognize is that the inevitable scarcity of unmistakable physical evidence unavoidably makes verification findings matters of judgment in the final analysis.<sup>144</sup>

Through the lowering of "standards of proof" and the exercise of "judgment," the Reagan administration can "prove" almost anything about the Soviet Union (or Nicaragua, or Cuba, or Angola). The "evidence" can in turn justify the increase in military spending, the madness of "Star Wars," the crimes of the CIA, the cuts in U.S. domestic social programs and the rise of our "misery index."

Such "evidence" sustains nuclear insanity. In an era when the demand for disarmament is widespread and growing, the Reaganite promoters of Cold War dogma require and seek false documentation of the nonexistent Soviet "threat." The new charges of Soviet "violations" testify to their imagination in meeting the very difficult task that confronts them: how to make lies believable.

In contrast, the peace sentiment and actions across our country today—striving to create a climate for fruitful negotiations, for disarmament and human survival—bear witness to a far more rational and humane approach to foreign policy.



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